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INTRODUCTION
During World War II countries throughout the world were focused on
domination, not only over their neighbors or other enemies further abroad, but
over their own people as well. Across the world governments removed civil
liberties, imprisoned citizens based on their race or religion, and executions
became commonplace for anyone perceived as a threat or simply stood in their
way. Throughout all of this the United States seemed like the “white knight”
from North America, with a willingness to fight the forces of fascism overseas
and the strength and courage to restore peace around the globe. While Americans
sacrificed so much at home and abroad to help liberate the world from fascism
and tyranny, the United States government with the support of the majority of
Americans chose to suspend the rights of many of its own citizens, and went so
far as to imprison over a hundred thousand loyal Americans based solely on
economic and racial discrimination. These loyal Japanese Americans lost their
homes, their belongings, and between two to four years of their lives as they were
isolated in inhospitable concentration camps located throughout the Western
deserts and Arkansas.
In the face of this miscarriage of justice and in spite of the many
Americans who supported the government’s removal of the Japanese Americans
from the West Coast there were groups of men and women from around the
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country who stood up to assist and aid them in whatever way they could. These
groups believed that there was no way to move a juggernaut like the U.S. War
Department or put an end to the relocation, but they were willing to protest as
loudly as they could without causing a backlash from that juggernaut. On top of
that they did as much as they could and gave as much as they could spare in order
to ease the burden placed on the Japanese Americans. Groups like the American
Friends Service Committee (AFSC) chose to help the Japanese Americans from
the start of 1942 in every way they could. This aid originally focused on getting
students out of the camps and into colleges in the East but eventually ballooned
into countless other tasks as the war dragged on. The Society of Friends didn’t
lend their support in the hopes of making converts out of the Japanese or because
Quakers were not patriotic Americans. Nor did they limit their aid to other
Christians but gave of their time and energy to people of all religions because
their own faith admonished them to help any person in need and stressed that
equality was a core value central to their salvation. Perhaps just as importantly,
they honored the tradition adopted by the U.S. Constitution which promised every
man, woman, and child freedom and liberty regardless of race, sex, or religious
belief.
My argument in this thesis is that while the AFSC in general, and some of
its leaders in particular, wanted to help the Japanese who were subjected to
internment during World War II, their results were mixed for many reasons.
Furthermore, the AFSC had to walk a fine line in working with both the
government and the interned Japanese. That tightrope walk forced them to make
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certain concessions to the government and forced the Friends to turn their backs
on one of their core tenets, namely the call to fight injustice and always “speak
truth to power.” My thesis is that the AFSC’s level of success was remarkable
given certain constraints, but that in the end those internal and external constraints
stood in the way of their success. In the end their results were spotty at best; in
some ways the undertaking was a huge success while in other regards it could be
looked at as an abject failure. Furthermore, the AFSC’s experience giving aid to
both the Japanese and the federal government during World War II presaged the
triangular relationship that formed between NGOs, the people they helped and the
United States government for the rest of the century.
The academic study of the Japanese American internment is long and
thorough. The bulk of research has focused mainly on the circumstances
surrounding the victims of Executive order 9066, but the American Friends have
not been absent from scholarly debate. Several studies have been written
regarding the role played by the various Caucasian Christian groups who helped
give aid to those victims, and one by Allan Austin focused entirely on the
National Japanese American Student Relocation Committee. None, however,
have specifically delved into the various activities taken on by the AFSC or the
important role it played in coordinating efforts to get students, individuals and
entire families out of the camps. Austin’s book entitled From Concentration
Camps to Campus does a great job of showing how mainstream Protestant groups
helped students leave the camps and enter colleges and universities across the
country through the efforts of the NJARC but stops short of revealing the scope
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Quaker involvement. In Storied Lives Gary Okihiro discusses the effects
internment had on Japanese American students on both an individual and personal
level including the aid given to them by the AFSC. However, his in depth
analysis misses the broader issues that challenged the Quaker’s relief efforts.
Many books and articles briefly mention the aid given by the Friends but fail to
go into the details of how important their participation was to the overall well
being of the Japanese Americans. This study seeks to bring that argument to the
forefront and show just how much was and wasn’t accomplished between January
1942 and September 1945, because in the end it was those successes and failures
that impacted the lives and futures of thousands of innocent people.
This work is divided into eight sections, including this opening
introduction. The second section is based on secondary sources and is titled
“Quaker Philosophy and History.” It is an overview of the Friends’ origins and
the basis of its theology and practice. Their core principle of “speaking truth to
power” focused on confronting those causing society’s problems but was largely
ignored in this undertaking. This could very well have been one of the few times
in Quaker history where the Friends chose to hold their tongues and put their
theological convictions aside believing that it would have only hindered the
process of resettlement and ultimately hurt their Japanese American neighbors.
Continuing with secondary sources is the third section which explores the
“History of the Internment” through the logistics of the exclusion and the actions
that led to the internment of the Japanese during World War II. This section as
well as all the subsequent parts of this thesis is also based on archival material
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found in the Friends archive headquarters in Philadelphia and at the University of
Washington in Seattle. Section four is titled “The Student Relocation Movement”
and it introduces the reader to the formation and work of the National Japanese
American Student Relocation Committee and shows how Quaker pragmatism and
bureaucratic red tape often stood in the way of getting people out of the camps.
Individuals in this organization tirelessly worked to place college-age Japanese
into educational institutions across America but found that placement was neither
quick nor easy because it was dependent on many factors such as community
approval, financial limitations and discrimination.
In the fifth section “Friends Hostels” explores the immense need for
housing which led the Friends to create hostels and find employment for those
seeking to leave the internment camps and move to cities like Chicago and
Cincinnati. In section six the reader will begin to see what a tightrope the Friends
had to walk while trying to help the Japanese in internment camps. Entitled
“Internal and External Difficulties,” this portion of the thesis notes how much the
Friends wanted to do, and yet found themselves impotent when dealing with
larger institutions. Comparing their situation to later instances where
humanitarian organizations were co-opted by the government in order to give
humanitarian aid while swaying public opinion reveals that the AFSC was not
only employed as a tool by the United States government but that their work was
used as a model by the government to be used over and over again throughout the
rest of the twentieth century. Section seven looks at a case study of one of the
West Coast leaders in the Friends’ movement and is named after one such leader.
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“Floyd Schmoe” was based out of Seattle and his story demonstrates the promises
and challenges for what the Friends tried to do during World War II. His
individual fervor to help get people out of camps was usually met with caution
from the head office in Philadelphia and shows that internal conflicts helped to
confound the amount of aid that was given. Section eight is titled “Why Leave?”
and it examines how the Friends dealt with Japanese in the camps who were
reluctant to leave the security of their barbed-wire compound behind. The
“Conclusion” examines the legacy of the Friends work with Japanese in the
World War II internment camps.
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QUAKER PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY
When George Fox founded the Society of Friends in the seventeenth
century he probably couldn’t have imagined that his core beliefs would eventually
evolve into an organization known throughout the world as an award-winning
example of Christian mysticism embodied in action. When looking at most sects
that have arisen from the three major Western religions, one sees that the role a
person’s faith plays in their everyday life is generally personal or internalized,
based on their individual relationship with the divine. Of course members of
every faith have sought to help others by fighting social and economic injustice or
tithing for the poor, but few religious groups have actually incorporated the
concept of service as a sacrament. The Society of Friends directs each member to
strive to make the world a better place and goes so far as to place this sacrament
as a central tenet of the faith and each person’s spiritual growth. The history of
the Friends is full of examples of selfless giving and the philosophy of social
change, and this drive ultimately culminated in the establishment of an
organizational branch devoted solely to worldwide service known as the
American Friends Service Committee (AFSC). As the founding Chairman of the
AFSC explained, “In the early and middle periods of Quaker history experiments
in the service of love were apt to be spontaneously entered into as the individual
concern of a tender heart who followed a leading that seemed to be divinely given
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to him.”1 The AFSC changed this personal movement into what was to become
an organized and committed force of this “service of love”, one that has worked
tirelessly since World War I to bring all faiths together to help people who have
been disadvantaged throughout the world. But what aspect of Quaker philosophy
differentiates Friends from other Protestant groups and leads them down this path
of service?
George Fox began his mission to find what he called “Friends” throughout
England during the 1600’s, and while he based his faith on the beliefs of
Calvinism, his extreme views caused both he and his followers to face constant
persecution in the form of fines, imprisonment, and even execution. First of all he
believed that everyone on earth is born truly equal, irrespective of race, gender, or
nationality, because internally everyone is considered to possess a part of God.
At a time when women were treated as second-class citizens and members of
other races were looked upon as either sub-human or as property, Quakers
experimented with the idea of treating everyone equally. They took themselves
out of the system of class hierarchy that dominated England and refused to
address the nobility as their betters or take off their hats in front of members of
higher classes. Because of this belief in equality, Fox not only abolished the class
system within the religion but also declared that there was no authority, either
spiritual or temporal, which Friends must swear allegiance to because God is
within every human being and each individual is partly divine. As a result,
“Unlike other organizations, those who are in the minority are not outvoted but
1

Jones, Mary Hoxie, Swords into Ploughshares: An account of the AFSC 19171937 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1937), viii.
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convinced. Men, women, and children are at liberty to speak in any meeting; the
delegates who are appointed at quarterly and yearly meetings to ensure adequate
representation do not enjoy any unusual position or prerogative. Women are
regarded with absolute equality in Quaker policy.”2 It would make sense then that
the concept most commonly associated with Quaker philosophy, namely the
taking of human life, is outlawed because it would be tantamount to executing the
part of God which resides within each human being, whether they be homeless
and living on the streets or incredibly wealthy and living in a palace.
On top of these concepts of equality Friends “have no theological
language and no formal creed or confession of binding authority,” and while the
writings of George Fox, William Penn, and others such as Rufus Jones are
considered “inspired,” no book including the Bible is taken as a final or
unchallengeable work. As Balwant Nevaskar states, “Although great importance
is placed on the Bible, the Spirit of God that produced the Bible is given
preeminence. Among other Protestant groups there is a tendency for the
orthodoxy to accept the Bible as the final authority in all religious matters,
whereas among the Quakers it is the modern liberals who are drawn to the
authority of the Bible.”3
George Fox based his understanding of God’s relationship to humans on
one verse found in the book of John, chapter one, verse nine, which states; “that
was the true light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world.” This
2

Nevaskar, Balwant, Capitalists without Capitalism: The Jains of India and the
Quakers of the West (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Corporation,
1971), 75.
3
Ibid.,74.
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light contained inside every individual is what connects human beings to God
directly, and allows for a personal relationship to the divine that can only be
realized by quietly meditating and listening to the voice of God speak to one from
within. This concept of human unity with God defines the Society of Friends as
mystical at its very core because mystics believe that all human beings can
connect with God directly either through some form of meditation or physical
endeavor. Almost every major religion contains some form of mysticism which
usually embodies itself in some form of human asceticism like the yogis in
Hinduism, the Zen monks in Buddhism, or the Trappist monks in the Catholic
Church. Friends are one of the only groups who have worked hard to keep their
mystical faith fundamentally social in nature, and their spirituality tied to
performing acts in this world. As a result, unlike most Christians Quakers place
little to no weight on the sacraments, and as Charles M. Woodman remarks: “In
its place they attempted to live the sacrament in their relations with their fellow
men. In other words, all life and, hence, all human conduct were sacraments. No
higher ideal for human action had ever been set.”4 So while most Christians
focused on attaining heaven through sacramental steps such as baptism,
communion, or confirmation, and used the intercession of priests or ministers to
help them along the way, there are no intermediaries between Quakers and their
God. The only two sacraments they seek to obtain are the mystical union of
themselves with God and the elevation of all members of society. In many ways
the Society of Friend’s belief in social awareness is the temporal mirror to the
Mahayana Buddhist belief that all of humanity must work to help one another
4

Ibid. 78.
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attain Nirvana simultaneously, so that the whole group might escape samsara at
once, as on a great raft, knowing full well that to work selfishly towards attaining
Nirvana alone would be an empty achievement.
The equality the Friends wish to obtain is referred to as a perfect “social
order”, which is a lofty goal that is generally at odds with the ranking members of
society. George Fox often found himself in conflict with society’s elite during the
1600’s and was imprisoned over and over again for exercising his beliefs and
trying to create a new world order which sought to overturn the one in place. For
hundreds of years, the Quaker concept of social order sought to promote programs
that the United States only implemented during the past century under Franklin
Roosevelt’s New Deal: “From the beginning of the movement the Quakers have
been active in poor relief, education of youth and adults, helping alcoholics,
public health, care of the insane, instituting reforms in the prisons, and the
abolition of slave trade and slavery.”5 These goals evolved as the group grew in
numbers and society changed alongside the industrial revolution. For instance,
drinking wasn’t originally looked upon as being a grave social concern because
everyone drank in large quantities during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
whether they were at home, in public, or even at work. As alcoholics filled the
jails, accidental deaths grew to be common; serious workplace injuries became
part and parcel with industrialization and many Quakers saw these social ills as
byproducts of alcohol abuse. Strangely enough, the original arguments put forth
by the Quakers against the manufacture of alcohol two centuries ago mirrors
many arguments used today in regards to alleviating food shortages and high
5
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grain prices around the world. They argued in the eighteenth century that cereal
crops shouldn’t be used for making beer and hard liquor because it took food out
of hungry mouths. Today a similar argument states that it is immoral to use food
stores to make biofuels or to feed cattle because that drives up grain prices and
hurts poor people living in third world communities. So by 1839 the Quakers had
not only outlawed drinking amongst their own members, they had helped to start
the temperance movements in England and the United States that would
eventually lead to prohibition.
In regards to race, the Quakers were also in the vanguard. Originally
slaveholders themselves, their ideology once again evolved as they saw that
injustice and harsh treatment was commonly heaped upon slaves. The report of
the committee on race relations in Philadelphia summed up Quaker sentiment best
when they stated, “We must secure for every man, regardless of race, creed or
color, the right to earn a living for himself and for those he loves. This right is
almost as sacred as the right to life itself. Every child must have the right to grow
up in an environment in which he has a decent chance to develop as a healthy and
normal human being. Only one issue is involved, the fundamental equality of all
men in the sight of God.”6 Original Quaker sentiment stated that their duty was
merely to teach slaves by example how to become good Christians, but once again
that was adapted as Friends saw that something wasn’t right with a system that
allowed owners to beat or lynch their slaves. This led the Quakers to free their
own slaves, and subsequently they met to discuss the problems of slavery in
America as a whole and eventually took part in the underground railroad and the
6
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13
movement for the abolition of slavery altogether. In regards to Native Americans,
“The Quakers believed that Christ had died for all men—including the Indians
and the Negroes—and that each had an eternal soul in spite of his different skin
color.”7 Ironically, in the land of the free and the home of the brave the only
treaty in U.S. history between white settlers and Native Americans that was
neither ignored, altered, or completely rescinded was the one between the famous
Quaker William Penn and the local Native Americans in Pennsylvania. Actually
one of the few paintings that was looked upon as modest enough to be seen
hanging inside a Quaker house up until the twentieth century was of Penn meeting
with the Delaware Indians and signing the peace treaty which they claim has been
honored to this day. Penn also believed that it was immoral to give alcohol to
Native Americans in order to take advantage of them and that beating a slave or
not paying someone for the work that they did was against Christian principles.
Many social issues that attracted the attention of the Friends needed no evolution
in thought to spur them into action.
From early on the Quakers pushed the British government to take care of
the sick who couldn’t support themselves, asking that hospitals be built for the
poor, specialized institutions be funded to aid ostracized groups like the blind and
the deaf, and that special asylums be set aside so that people with mental illnesses
could be treated and helped instead of mocked and abused in the streets. Poverty
has always been a major focus of the Friends who hold that social equality
demands not only the abolishment of a class system, but that everyone is fed,
clothed, and given a decent standard of living. The programs instituted by the
7
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Quakers were not simple charity nor did they look like modern welfare, but in
true Calvinistic spirit their philosophy could be compared to the motto adopted by
Habitat for Humanity over the past thirty years urging people to offer the poor a
hand-up, not a hand out. Friends have always felt that aiding the poor by simply
giving them charity keeps them from wanting to work.
Since so many Quakers had been sent to government prisons and other
institutions, a number of them became intimately involved in prison reform as
well. Much like their views on getting out of poverty, “According to Quaker
philosophy, reform, not punishment, should be the aim of imprisonment.”8 The
term penitentiary actually came from a new style of managing prisons introduced
by the Quakers in the state of Pennsylvania. They encouraged separating the
criminals according to the harshness of their crimes, believing that having
hardened criminals in large holding pens with people being held for minor
offenses such as not doffing their hats for the nobility fostered the perfect
breeding ground for more hardened criminals. One Quaker prison reformer
named John Howard borrowed the Catholic notion of isolating monks in
individual cells and applied it to prisoners so that they wouldn’t be able to
influence one another in a negative way. The goal was also to give prisoners time
to reflect on life and their misdeeds in a quiet and peaceful manner, much as
someone would do in a Quaker meeting. Whether they were good ideas such as
separating hardened from petty criminals or controversial measures such as
isolating prisoners for weeks on end in solitary confinement, many of the reforms

8
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first introduced by Quakers in the nineteenth century are still being used in
prisons around the world today.
Like all religious movements the Society of Friends went through a series
of changes as it evolved and moved towards the twentieth century. The original
ideas put forth by Fox and Penn were changed as the movement as a whole
adjusted to the industrial revolution in North America. As more people began to
leave the countryside and move into cities such as Philadelphia and New York
splinter groups formed and broke off from the main sect. Some of these groups
held onto the early ideas regarding the light within and quiet meditation while
others introduced sacraments such as baptism; sermons became common in other
Quaker meeting-houses. But by the end of the nineteenth century a new leader
emerged, Rufus Jones, who inadvertently steered the Friends back to their
mystical roots and away from many of the Protestant elements that had crept into
the religion while simultaneously looking for new ways to focus on the sacrament
of service. As one scholar noted, “earlier generations of Quakers had taken aim at
specific evils that seemed antithetic to the spread of the Gospel. These modern
ideas continued to do so, but within a broader vision of remaking American
society along the lines of the teachings of the New Testament.”9 The greatest
failure of Christians in the past, Thomas Newlin declared in 1897, was that they
had failed to realize that “a new society was quite as emphatic in Christ’s teaching
as a new man.”10 The idea espoused was that an individual cannot prosper or
9
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better themselves if they are in an environment filled with temptation and vice. If
the society around you is in shambles to the point where you can’t concentrate on
your own unity with God, then it is your duty to improve society as a whole.
These were the concepts that Rufus Jones and the rest of the Friends carried with
them into a century that would become marked by human depravity and war, a
century that would end up keeping the Quakers incredibly busy.
The AFSC was founded on the eve of America’s participation in World
War I, as Friends in the U.S. were watching their brethren in Britain get drafted
and then imprisoned if they refused to join in the fighting. The main issue in the
United States was that even if the Army didn’t need the Quakers to join the
infantry, it still wanted them to take some part in the war effort, whether it be
cooking for the soldiers or working in the medical field as many Quakers had
done during the Civil War. Many Quakers weren’t against helping the
government altogether, they just didn’t want to kill other human beings while
serving their country. Initially the AFSC worked in conjunction with the
American Red Cross to aid the French Red Cross by sending men and women
over to help wounded soldiers and civilians. This movement snowballed as
volunteers found more and more groups that they wanted to help throughout
Europe and Russia. What started out as a temporary mission to help out people in
need while simultaneously keeping their status as conscientious objectors,
continued well beyond the end of the war when the fighting had stopped and the
soldiers had returned home. “The signing of the armistice did not miraculously
restore French villages, nor feed German children, nor give coal to Austria, nor
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prevent famine in Russia, nor remove typhus fever from Poland, nor do away with
the need for constructive peace, international and interracial programs, nor give
work to unemployed miners. The mission remained in France until 1920 but their
return to the America was the beginning of another great period of service.”11
The AFSC turned their eyes back towards home, to helping miners and fighting
racial injustice between blacks and whites, even towards helping to mend
relations between Japan and the U.S. in the face of the Alien Exclusion Act.
In 1924 the AFSC founded a new “interracial section” to deal with what it
saw as blatant racism in the United States, a section that would eventually lead it
toward constructing a strong relationship with both the Japanese and Japanese
Americans. As white Americans became more and more xenophobic against
Asians trying to immigrate to the U.S., Clarence Pickett, the future chairman of
the AFSC wrote, “One of the factors in Friends’ awakening to this situation was
the passage of the Japanese exclusion clause of the immigration act of 1924.
Pamphlets were issued by the Committee, setting forth Friends’ opposition to the
Oriental exclusion policy, and pointing out its dangers.”12 The AFSC understood
that the passage of the Exclusion Act was a major blunder on the part of the U.S.
government and seriously tarnished its relations with Japan. Dr. Inazo Nitobe of
the League of Nations Secretariat was quoted as saying: “When I went back to
Japan I found the older men almost heartbroken. I have been a Christian for fifty
years and after preaching brotherhood for all these years, to have our whole nation
11
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branded as inferior! The earthquake was terrible, but the spiritual devastation
caused in Japan by the Immigration Act was far worse.”13 So the Friends sent
emissaries to Japan to teach English and make inroads with the Japanese
government while inviting several Japanese students to the U.S. to study and live
with American families. They even had a Japanese American Friend, Yasushi
Hasegawa travel around the U.S. promoting better relations between Americans
and the Japanese. Unfortunately the following decade proved to be a downward
spiral in the relationship between the two countries that ended with the attack on
Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.
Many people in the United States today are under the impression that the
internment camps were the one and only event perpetrated against the Japanese in
the United States. They believe that this was a military response to the attack on
Pearl Harbor, and that there was a rational belief by the military authorities that
the Japanese living in the continental United States posed a threat to national
security. In fact it was the last in a long line of offenses committed by white
Americans against Asian immigrants starting around the turn of the century. The
first step was taken in 1908 with the passing of the Gentleman’s Agreement
between the United States and Japan which curtailed the addition of any new
immigrants coming to the United States while allowing the wives, parents and
children of Japanese men already living and working in the U.S. to join the men.
This was followed up in 1924 by the Exclusion Act which cut off all Japanese
immigration to the U.S. until 1952, effectively leaving the Japanese men and
women already in America marooned from their families and friends who may or
13
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may not have wished to join them. On top of that no Japanese man or woman
could become a United States citizen until 1952. They could of course pay taxes
to the government and own businesses but they couldn’t vote in elections nor
were they recipients of the rights of citizenship that most Americans take for
granted.14
Individual states added to these federal measures by passing their own
laws aimed at slowing down the “Yellow Peril” as they saw fit. In San Francisco
the Japanese were asked to leave the public schools and join the Korean and
Chinese students at separate schools set aside for Asian students. Antimiscegenation laws were also introduced so that Japanese men and women
couldn’t marry outside of their race. California passed the Alien Land Law in
1913 that prohibited anyone born in Japan from owning property in the state of
California. This law in particular placed a heavy burden on the Japanese because
it meant that they were forced to rent the buildings that they lived and worked in
along with the land where they grew their crops. Their only other option was to
ask non-Japanese friends or neighbors to hold their property for them and hope
that these friends were honest in the long run. This was in an era when over 45%
of the Japanese were involved in agriculture, and an even larger percent were tied
to it in one way or another, and when rental rates for whites stood at $10.91 an
acre while the Japanese paid an average of $24.75.15 The government had already
had legislation on the books against the Japanese for many years, and
14
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discrimination was commonplace, but all of this came to a head when the
Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and very little persuasion was needed for
Americans to turn against their Japanese neighbors and force them into prison
camps.

HISTORY OF THE INTERNMENT
The first and foremost reason given for placing the Japanese in
concentration camps was that it was a military necessity and that the Japanese
could very well represent a “fifth column” along the West Coast. That meant that
the government believed they could rise up to help their native Japanese brethren
overrun the United States in the eventuality that the continental U.S. was attacked
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and they were allowed to remain along the coast. This of course holds very little
water today as it has been revealed that both the FBI and the military felt that
there was no threat coming from the Japanese American community after the
attack on Pearl Harbor. On the Hawaiian Islands where the Japanese were more
closely tied to their homeland and where they constituted over a third of the
population, only 1% of them were interned as enemies of the state. On the other
hand, on the continental United States where the Japanese were a small
percentage of the overall population and had cut most of their ties with Japan,
over 90% of the population was sent to camps. Some argued at the time that this
was for their own good—that there would have been no way to protect them from
vigilante justice so it was best to keep them out of sight. In reality only twentyfive major crimes were reported as having been carried out against the Japanese
before they were interned. Even so, vigilante justice is a civil affair that could
have been handled by the police simply doing their job without the military
getting involved.
Other arguments for incarceration that were discussed before the
internment stated that having them in camps would benefit the military in terms of
prisoner exchanges because they could be exchanged for POW’s or could be used
as tools of reprisal. The actual existence of military reasoning for the internment
was so minor that the man in charge of West Coast security, Lieutenant General
John L. DeWitt, used a fear tactic that might have been studied by George W.
Bush’s tacticians when they were putting together their reasoning for invading
Iraq. DeWitt’s argument stated, “the very fact that no sabotage has taken place to
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date is a disturbing and confirming indication that such action will be taken.”16
The only military purpose that the internment might have served was put forth by
a Quaker woman named Elizabeth Johnson who stated in an essay written in
December of 1942 that “the directors of these centers, foreseeing a post-war
world in which many relocations will occur all over the world, regards the centers
as “proving grounds” where sound democratic methods of dealing with
disintegrated communities may be developed. Their aim is the steady gradual
establishment of normal conditions.”17 Roger Daniels summed it up best when he
wrote,
“The reasons for the establishment of these concentration camps
are clear. A deteriorating military situation created the opportunity
for American racists to get their views accepted by the national
leadership. The constitution was treated as a scrap of paper, not
only by Mccloy, Stimson, and Roosevelt, but by the entire
congress, which approved and implemented everything done to the
Japanese Americans, and by the Supreme Court of the United
States, which in December 1944, nearly three years after the fact,
in effect sanctioned the incarcerating of the Japanese
Americans.”18
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So there were many ideas circulating as to why the Japanese should be interned,
but the most rational reasoning behind why it actually took place was probably a
combination of racism mixed with economic greed.
Lieutenant General Dewitt best summed up his feelings in regards to
Japanese Americans when he stated that “the Japanese race is an enemy race and
while many second and third generation Japanese born on United States soil,
possessed of the United States citizenship, have become “Americanized”, the
racial strains are undiluted. That Japan is allied with Germany and Italy in this
struggle is no ground for assuming that any Japanese, barred from assimilation by
convention as he is, though born and raised in the United States, will not turn
against this nation when the final test of loyalty comes.”19 In other words, while
the Germans and Italians living in America were good people whose distant
cousins in Europe were being led astray by fascist regimes, the Japanese race as a
whole was evil and unalterably tied to their Emperor, even if they had never
stepped foot on Japanese soil and pled complete loyalty to the American
government. According to Donna Nagata in her work regarding the psychological
impact of the internment, the difference between the Japanese Americans and
their German and Italian counterparts who were more numerous and more
politically powerful on the U.S. mainland was that the American people viewed
the Japanese as “nonentities, expendable, or undeserving: consequently, harming
them appears acceptable, appropriate, or just.”20 By and large the general public
stood behind the removal, polls at the time showed that 60% of Americans wanted
19
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Japanese Americans born in the U.S.to be interned, and 93% were in favor of
imprisonment for anyone born in Japan. The American Legion was one of the
first organizations that called for the removal of all Japanese Americans from the
West Coast. The California Joint Immigration Committee, an organization that
was formerly known as the Japanese Exclusion League, reasserted its earlier
claims that the Japanese could not assimilate into American society. In a press
release to California Newspapers, they declared, “those born in this country are
American citizens by right of birth, but they are also Japanese citizens, liable… to
be called to bear arms for their Emperor, either in front of, or behind, enemy
lines.”21
The justice system even took part in supporting the internment by either
blatantly ruling against any Nisei who stood up for their rights, or by ignoring
their cases altogether. Judge Lloyd L. Black ruled against one petition for habeas
corpus filed by a young woman named Mary Ventura who refused to enter the
camps by stating: “how many in this courtroom doubt that in Tokyo they
consider all of Japanese ancestry though born in the United States to be citizens or
subjects of the Japanese Imperial government? How many believe that if our
enemies should manage to send a suicide squadron of parachutes to Puget Sound
that the Enemy High command would not hope for assistance from many
American born Japanese?” Mitsuye Endo also filed a habeas corpus petition in
July of 1942, but the Supreme Court ignored her right to a speedy trial by not
ruling on it until 1944 when the high court ruled unanimously that it was
21
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unconstitutional to hold United States citizens against their will. By then over
70% of those who had been interned had spent two and a half years in prison and
the government was already drafting plans to permit the Japanese to leave the
camps and return to their homes on the West Coast so the Court’s ruling was a
case of too little, too late. This sense of moral exclusion pervaded every aspect of
the U.S. government and made it easy to rationalize the locking up innocent
Americans, but there was a more practical reason behind the eagerness with
which Western politicians encouraged the federal government to go ahead with
the internment.
In 1940 the average value for farmland in America was approximately
$37.94 an acre, while the average value for an acre of Japanese owned farmland
was approximately $279.96. The disparity was quite large, and the Japanese had
worked tirelessly throughout the Great Depression to grow and expand the small,
labor-intensive fruit and vegetable farms that thrived along the West Coast. As a
result, agricultural groups stood to benefit greatly from the disappearance of the
Japanese farmers, truckers and laborers. As the managing secretary of the
Grower-Shipper Vegetable Association was recorded as stating: “We’re charged
with wanting to get rid of the Japs for selfish reasons. We might as well be
honest. We do. If all the Japs were removed tomorrow, we’d never miss them in
two weeks, because the white farmers can take over and produce everything the
Jap grows. And we don’t want them back when the war ends either.”22 All in all
the relocation would create a large economic vacuum that would have to be filled
up by good, hardworking whites once the Japanese went away, and it was the
22
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Western politicians who united to keep the fight alive because in the end the
payoff included what has been conservatively estimated at somewhere close to 3
billion dollars in Japanese losses. It is impossible not to suspect that those losses
were someone else’s gains.23 So the real question at this point is what did the
government do to coerce 120,000 loyal Americans into actually putting up with
being imprisoned simply because of their race?
The first thing that the FBI did after Pearl Harbor was to arrest 1,500 Issei
(first generation Japanese immigrants) leaders who had traditionally been the
backbone of their communities, effectively neutralizing groups by removing their
spokesmen. The few Japanese men and women who did stand up and refused to
obey the curfews or failed to report to the train stations and enter the camps were
arrested and convicted, having to spend months in jail as a result. As Judge Black
stated in the Ventura case, “aside from any right involved it seems to me that if
petitioner is as loyal and devoted as her petition avers she would be glad to
conform to the precautions which Congress, the President and the armed forces
deem requisite.” How could anyone fight the kind of absurd logic that requested
one to give up their freedom and submit to actions completely contrary to the
United States Constitution in order to prove their patriotism? As Donna Nagata
explains, in the face of such injustice those being abused typically have four types
of responses, they can try to restore justice, they can fight back against the
offender, they can try to avoid the situation entirely, or they can resign themselves
to the injustice. The Japanese Americans quickly, if not altogether eagerly, felt
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they had no option but to choose the latter of the four.24 History had taught the
Japanese living in America that injustice was to be expected, and Nagata explains
that people accustomed to constant discrimination are much more likely to put up
with more and more discrimination whenever it is meted out. There was also a
push from within the Japanese community to not fight back against the oppressor
because the leaders feared that they would appear disloyal or traitorous to the
general public, and of course the Japanese culture values interdependence over
independence, loyalty and obedience over rocking the boat or challenging
authority.
The government did not help by aiding the divisions being created in the
Japanese American community once they were in camps. They chose to bar the
Issei from holding any elected offices in the camps and gave all official authority
to the second and third generations. This system helped disenfranchise the
Japanese elders and created “a structure which directly opposed Japanese cultural
values of filial piety and deference to one’s elders.”25 On top of that there was a
loyalty oath given to everyone which asked two questions, whether men would be
willing to serve in the armed forces, and whether everyone would swear
allegiance to the U.S. and forswear any allegiance to Japan. This tore apart
families because it forced young men to join the military for fear of appearing
unpatriotic while it asked the Issei to denounce their Japanese citizenship. The
latter point is ironic become the U.S. government wouldn’t allow them to become
citizens in the first place, so if the Issei renounced their Japanese citizenship in
24
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essence they became a group of people without any nationality. All in all what
the U.S. created was a rather blind and slippery slope that the Japanese could not
have foreseen, a slope they quickly slid down until they found themselves unable
to leave the camps. Much like the Jews in Nazi occupied Germany, the Japanese
Americans couldn’t really believe that their government would put them in prison
just because of their race, and once they were in the camps they found it
incredibly hard to get themselves out of them.
It makes sense that the Japanese were unable to uproot themselves and
move east in the three months they were given to leave the government
sanctioned Western Defense Zone especially since the evacuation took place at
the end of the Great Depression. Selling one’s land, businesses, and property in
the best of times can take months of negotiating, but to do so in 1942 when
investment capital was almost non-existent would have been nearly impossible.
In addition every white man on the West Coast heard rumors that the government
would probably force the Japanese to leave their property behind and head east of
the mountains which made them even less likely to pay top dollar for land that the
Issei didn’t even legally own. Because they couldn’t hold titles for the property
that they had purchased they were left at the mercy of their neighbors whom many
had trusted to hold those titles for them. These neighbors could simply steal the
land while they were away or wait for the Japanese to stop making their mortgage
payments once they were behind barbed wire and unable to make a living. So the
majority of the Japanese Americans suffered in the camps for the next three years
and emerged from the war financially unstable, but some were able to gain their
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freedom and start over in different regions of the United States. That was mostly
due to the fact that there were groups of conscientious Americans willing to help
protect their interests and help them start new lives outside of the prisons.
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THE STUDENT RELOCATION MOVEMENT
When analyzing the services rendered to the Japanese Americans by the
AFSC during the war it is best to remember that the situation was akin to
watching the entire life cycle of a humanitarian organization which should have
spanned decades play itself out in a three year period. It is also important to keep
in mind that everyone hoped the war would end sooner than later, and once the
war was over the committee set up to aid the Japanese Americans would disband
as the camps were emptied. The organization that was put together to help
relocate students was called the National Japanese American Student Relocation
Committee (NJAMSRC), and its evolution took place under the umbrella of a
government controlled situation that was manufactured out of thin air. As a result
their effectiveness was marred by the fact that it was conceived on the fly and it
was neither quick, efficient, or even supported by the majority of Americans. The
men and women of the AFSC had to go through reams of red tape to get anyone
out of the camps during the first two years of the war, and then they were caught
up in the effort of trying to get everyone left inside the camps into housing out on
the West Coast all at once during 1945. Their roles and activities changed not
only as the war progressed but also at the whims of the Federal Government.
What started as an effort to simply get a few thousand students out of the camps
and into colleges turned into a massive undertaking that could have employed
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thousands of paid staff instead of the skeleton crew that was put together of
poorly paid workers, conscientious objectors, and volunteers. The driving force
behind everything that the AFSC did was the focus on accomplishing whatever
was humanly possible in order to help the Japanese overcome a serious injustice
no matter how small or overwhelmingly large the tasks might have seemed at the
time.
Much of what the Quakers attempted to do could be regarded as an
unmitigated failure because they did not have the time or the finances to
accomplish many of their more lofty goals. The reality was that they were
constantly working to come from behind as new challenges arose, and the
government threw new hurdles in their path and changed the rules of the game as
the war progressed. Of course the imprisonment of the Japanese Americans was
as much of a surprise to the Friends as it was for the Japanese Americans
themselves. When the government decided to move 120,000 Americans into the
camps the Friends were not sitting idly by waiting for a government-induced
catastrophe but were already working at full capacity on several other programs.
The rest of the world was already deeply engaged in World War II and there were
humanitarian crises occurring throughout Europe and Asia. Reed Cary, the
president of the AFSC admitted in response to a letter sent to him from a
professor at Princeton; “This Japanese question as a whole has burst upon us at a
time when the AFSC commitments in a variety of directions are extremely heavy,
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however, it was decided to go forward as rapidly as possible with the project
dealing with the transfer of students.”26
Initially a group of people came together and formed a Committee on
Resettlement of Japanese Americans to get things in motion before the Japanese
were actually forced to leave the West Coast. This consisted not only of Quakers
but also religious leaders from several denominations and many faculty members
from colleges and universities across America. For example, the acting President
of the Committee, John Nason, was also the president of Swarthmore College in
Pennsylvania, and one of the West Coast committee members instrumental in
getting student’s references put together was Lyman Wilbur, the President of
Stanford. These weren’t retired or out of work Quakers who volunteered to get
onboard and help, but prominent citizens and busy men who were willing to give
up their valuable time to write letters, go to meetings, speak publicly about the
relocation, and give financially whatever they could afford. In March of 1942 the
War Relocation Authority was set up with Milton Eisenhower appointed as the
acting director; he sent a letter addressed to Clarence Pickett of the AFSC. In it
he states:
The American Friends Service Committee can make a significant
contribution to the program of the War Relocation Authority. It is
not feasible for the War Relocation Authority to undertake such a
university program for American-citizen Japanese, but this in no
way detracts from the desirability of such an accomplishment.
26
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Consequently I should like to ask that you establish a committee
which would aid you in the selection and certification of students
at assembly or relocation centers. I should like to have you not
only bring together a committee to formulate a program but also to
do the necessary follow-through work which will be necessary if
this program is to be realized.27
Clarence responded by stating that the Society of Friends would agree to
undertake the student placement on certain conditions, first of which being that
they wanted the WRA to write a letter explaining to anyone the AFSC might
come across that the NJASRC was “a quasi-official agency established at the
specific request” of the WRA and that any student who left the camps to start a
new life had gone through a thorough background check to make sure they were
not a threat to other Americans.28 Clarence also let Mr. Eisenhower know in a
letter that:
All of us were deeply humiliated that such a relocation problem
has seemed to be inescapable and especially that American citizens
are being detained. Having expressed our humiliation as American
citizens, we wish to offer our services in any way we can to assist
in the alleviation of the distress caused to Japanese and to prepare
them for useful membership in the American community. It is
only by some such policy as this that we shall be able to atone for
27

M.S. Eisenhower to Clarence Pickett, May 5, 1942. AFSC Archives. War
Relocation Authority.
28
Milton Eisenhower to College and University Presidents, August 7, 1942.
AFSC Archives. War Relocation Authority.

34
the violence that has been done to the constitutional rights of
American citizens.29
Having made it clear that the AFSC was not happy with the situation, they then
put their grievance aside and agreed to step in and assist the government
regardless, feeling that they couldn’t abandon their neighbors in a time of need
even if their own government had caused that need.
The next step in the process was to approach companies, charities, and
prominent men and women from around the country who they hoped would give
not only financial support, but also lend their names and titles to the project.
Some of these groups were the George F Baker Charity trust from New York
City, the Carnegie Corporation, the Columbia Foundation from San Francisco, the
Commonwealth Fund, The Ford Foundation in Dearborn Michigan, the Kresge
Foundation, the Rockefeller Brother’s Fund and the Charles Hayden Foundation.
The committee used quite a wide-ranging approach to get whomever they could
find to donate. Time was of the essence as John Nason illustrated when a list of
donors was given to him by stating “Henry Taft felt that a letter signed by him
and Roland Morris would not be effective, and that the approach should be an
individual one. Is there any way of using President Butler in this connection?
Individual approaches through interviews are laborious and take time; our need
for funds is immediate and urgent.”30 Other men and women were also
approached if they had any academic or personal connections to Japan, including:
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Mr. Frankinthall, a professor of Oriental Studies at Columbia, Hugh Borton from
the Institute of Japanese Studies at Columbia, Webb Wilson with the American
Council of Institute of Pacific Relations, and John W Davis from the law firm
Arthur Dean, Sullivan and Cromwell. Anyone was a target for NJASRC support
and fundraising. They approached English teachers and instructors who had
taught in Japan, a number of Americans who had lived in Japan during the years
leading up to the war, and businessmen who had branches in Japan. They even
asked for donations from factory and business owners who had lost all of their
investments or had been labeled as US spies and thrown into jail before being
kicked out of Japan.31 No one was considered beyond approach.
Surprisingly enough, one of the main setbacks to resettling the students
outside of the camps was the United States government, specifically the War
Department. Right from the start the AFSC was able to get dozens of universities
outside of the Western Defense Zone to agree to accept applications from
Japanese students presently held in the camps. Benefactors were ready and
willing to send money to pay for their travel expenses back East and their room
and board once they arrived; but as the head of the Office of Education admitted,
“Mr. Provinse has felt that negotiations with the War Department were so delicate
that if a letter went out and many colleges then expressed willingness to
participate, it might seem like a form of indirect pressure on the War
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Department.”32 In the same letter the Office of Education encouraged the
NJASRC to get their donors ready to give money, get the students physically
prepared to head East, get approval from the universities and the communities that
they would be moving to, and then once the government had given approval to the
colleges, the money, applications, and travel arrangements would be ready for
release and the students could leave the camps immediately. But this letter was
dated August 6, 1942, and unless things were different during the forties that
meant that students would have little to no chance of gaining their freedom from
incarceration and travel thousands of miles by rail to attend university terms
starting in September. In the end that is exactly what happened. In fact it took
the government until September 2nd to approve 100 colleges that the Japanese
could “safely” attend, and by November 1942, 284 colleges were deemed open to
the Japanese based on the fact that there were no defense installations or war
laboratories set up on those campuses or anywhere nearby.33 The doors were
opening at many universities but the Army and the AFSC itself set up countless
hoops that the students had to jump through in order to leave the camps and enter
schools.
First of all, the AFSC did not want independent applications sent from
students in the camps to institutions around the U.S., but wanted to maintain “the
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one official channel for placement and clearance.”34 A committee was formed to
handle all aspects of student relocation and it acted as the sole gatekeeper between
the students, the government and the colleges. While this may seem a bit over
controlling one must remember that this was an age without computers, cell
phones, or the World Wide Web. It is also important to note that the clientele was
being held behind barbed wire in the desert without easy access to phones so it
made sense to keep everything centralized and running through one clear channel.
The committee started by getting 2,000 Nisei to fill out questionnaires that
provided routine information such as grade point average and what discipline the
students wished to study, as well as much more interesting factors such as
“professional goals, service to the Japanese community, maturity of character,
evidence of successful Caucasian contacts, special interests or talents, etc., etc.”35
Initially the NJASRC would only accept students who could be personally
vouched for by Quakers or committee members from the West Coast. This could
be considered nepotism but it was in line with a committee goal to send out
students that Friends knew personally, students they could depend upon to make
the Japanese look like model citizens to whites in the Mid-West who had never
been exposed to someone of Asian descent. After those ambassadors of goodwill
made a positive impression and proved that they weren’t a threat to white
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America, the NJASRC would be able to open the floodgates and release
thousands of students at a time.
Once they found institutions willing to take Japanese students, the
NJASRC had to obtain transcripts and letters of recommendation from high
schools, colleges, and universities. Professor Botts with the University of
Washington Chemistry department wrote one such letter for Mary Iwamoto
stating, “This girl is tops. She has the finest scientific mind I have ever met in a
woman. She has a charming personality, a great capacity for work, and
understanding of situations that is very unusual. He who desires ability, honesty,
perseverance, and meticulous accuracy, can find no better than Mary Ishimoto.”36
They also needed West Coast community members for personal referrals and the
government asked that important members of the communities which were going
to host the Japanese students sign papers agreeing to let them move into their
towns before they could arrive. One of the first students to leave the camps was
Harvey Tanaka who had applied and was accepted to Haverford College in
Pennsylvania. His first stumbling block was the fact that the president of the
college had no idea what constituted community approval, so Reed Cary wrote
Mr. Morley a letter stating that, “Community approval should take the form of a
statement from some qualified law enforcement official, such as the chief of
police, sheriff, commissioner, etc., to the effect that public sentiment in your
community is not such as to take serious exception to the presence of Tanaka at
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Haverford college.”37 To show how preposterous and un-American this
qualification was, Norris E. Maloney, the sheriff in Madison Wisconsin, wrote a
response to one such application stating; “I have no authority under the state law
to authorize you to come to this state: and neither do I have authority to prevent
you from coming. You are spoken of very highly at the University of Wisconsin
and I certainly would have no objection to your coming here.”38 Probably the
most important hurdle to cross was whether or not the students had the funding to
support themselves in a new community or even pay to get themselves there to
begin with. Those with insufficient funds had to apply for help from the NJASRC
who dipped into the funds they had been raising from private donors around the
United States. Finally these American born citizens had to swear a loyalty oath to
the US government and once they had been approved as loyal Americans, they
were issued travel papers by the War Department and were able to leave the
camps and travel east.
Obviously funding was always a challenge for students and the AFSC not
only raised funds but also organized scholarships for the students. One such
example is the scholarship that had been set aside for an international exchange
that offered one Japanese woman the chance to come and study in Philadelphia
each year. The last woman who had come had just finished school after Pearl
Harbor and now the family who administered the scholarship wished it to be
given to a Nisei (second generation Japanese immigrant) woman from one of the
37
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camps. “They prefer a Christian, though this is not essential (not a Roman
Catholic). It should preferably be someone who has already had one or two years
of college and it is probable that if everything goes well they would carry her
through until her graduation.”39 In another letter Homer Morris noted that:
With respect to financial assistance, many organizations and
individuals have responded in fine spirit. It is evident that there
must be considerable funds available to supplement their own,
even in addition to the generous scholarships that are being offered
by many of the institutions. Church boards are making substantial
amounts available, and other sources of assistance are being
explored. One third of the students have sufficient personal
resources for the coming year, about one third will need almost
complete subsidization, the remaining third having some funds, but
not enough for the costs of a year of study. Some of the best and
most deserving students are among those without funds.40
In the end, many church boards rallied to pay for their members to attend college,
but 178 of the students were non-denominational and 129 of them needed direct
help from the AFSC. All in all of the 1308 students who left the camps for the
east that school year 994 needed some sort of assistance.41
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In some instances the Friends got very creative in getting students
educational opportunities. Such was the case in the Granada camp located in
Colorado where many recent high school graduates did not want to leave their
families behind. There were “A number of students without funds for attending
college away from home who wish to stay on in the project for a year. These
students do not want either a segregated Junior College in the camp nor do they
want to wait another year to get into school. We propose that they continue their
leadership in Granada and that at the same time they interpret the Japanese to the
nearby community in a way not available to beet field workers.”42 The NSRC
worked out a deal to reduce fees for these students to the point where they could
obtain both tuition and transportation for the 30 mile round trip to the nearest
Junior College for only 50 dollars per student per semester. This allowed the
students to stay close to their parents and receive an affordable education without
breaking up the families, an important issue that kept many individuals from ever
leaving camps to complete higher education. In the end there were only five or
six individuals who could afford this meager sum so Bob O’Brien of the NJASRC
wrote to the local Baptist Scholarship Board and encouraged them to donate
$500.00 needed to send ten additional students to college for the remainder of the
year.
By April 15, 1943, 1555 formerly interned individuals were in college,
and 358 were currently accepted by colleges to start in the fall. Throughout the
Midwest and East there were 521 colleges, universities, seminaries, or trade
42
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schools that indicated a willingness to accept Japanese American students. What
was lacking, however, was money; nearly $200,000.00 was needed to meet
expenses. In a pamphlet put together in 1942 to explain the situation to average
Americans, the AFSC outlined their mission to help resettle the Japanese and their
need for money to complete that mission. They tried to convey the concept to
everyday Americans that helping the Japanese Americans here in America would
have a “conciliatory influence in the Orient,” and would help to instill the
concepts of freedom and democracy that would eventually help America
throughout the world both during the war and after it was over.43 These
fundraising drives continued until all the Japanese had left the camps and the
AFSC officially completed all work assisting the Japanese Americans in 1946.
Even in 1945 the bulletins and public relations pamphlets were still full of
messages such as, “Because the Army has lifted its West Coast exclusion orders,
many supporters of the resettlement project have felt that the problem had been
solved and have turned their attention to the urgent need for the reconstruction
work that the Friends are doing in war-ravaged Europe. We know that such is not
the case and that the problem has not been solved and we are also facing difficulty
in raising our own budget.”44
By 1944 the drive to get students out of the camps had mostly run its
course because the majority of applicants left in the camps were either high
school seniors or the limited few who had not left in the preceding years because
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of familial obligations. This situation could be attributed to the fact that most of
the Nisei keen to leave the camps had already headed East, and those who hadn’t
entered colleges had left the camps to find work or joined the Army and were off
distinguishing themselves in Italy. So the new drive from late 1943 to the end of
1945 was to expand a program that administered hostels for those wishing to
resettle, and finding those people jobs outside the Western Defense Zone. For
example, the tallies at this point found that “Between 19 and 20,000 people (out
of a total 120,000) have gone out from the relocation centers on indefinite leave,
with between 2-3,000 out on extended seasonal leave. The city of Chicago has
the largest number of resettlers, over 3500, next comes Salt Lake City, Denver,
Cleveland, and Cincinnati. New York and other eastern cities have received
numbers of resettlers during the past few months. 85% are Nisei, the majority
ranging in age from 18 to 30. A report early in March showed 2500 relocated
students enrolled in 440 different institutions in 44 out of 48 states.”45

FRIENDS HOSTELS
Once again, to begin filling recently opened hostels, the AFSC decided
that it was best to allow in only Japanese Americans that could be vouched for to
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assure the greatest level of success for the program. The Quakers felt that, “The
invitation to the Hostels carries with it the strong obligation to secure a job for the
evacuee.”46 This was another situation where the Quakers knew that by taking
people in they would be responsible for not only supplying them with room and
board but their general welfare as well. They realized that they would be putting
themselves on the line to not only find them housing but also some sort of income
so that they could support themselves. For the most part they were correct in
regards to the responsibilities they were taking on by opening up these hostels.
For example, it was Joe Brown’s job to find jobs and housing for those wishing to
resettle in Chicago. He remarked on the fact that there was a big problem with
fluidity and that it was near to impossible to give advanced warning when there
would be space available in the hostels because no one knew when housing would
come available or when people would leave the hostels. He advised the camps
out West that, “It might be better if they would always have ready to leave at least
a group of two people who could start for Chicago as soon as they receive a
wire.”47 To merely consider these hostels as weigh stations or as places where
people stayed a few nights before moving on would be to undervalue the purpose
they actually served.
The Friends made it their responsibility to ensure that their charges were
well taken care of and lists of friendly doctors; nurses, dentists and even surgeons
were compiled. Many health professionals would come and visit the hostels and
46
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examine patients for a small stipend, often paid for by the AFSC. On top of that,
the Chicago office made sure that “…newcomers have been familiarized with
community agencies, informed of activities of interest to them, and introduced to
persons of good will and working on their integration into the community.”48
Education was of course very important and the AFSC contacted school
superintendents, teachers, and local principals so that children could start
attending schools as soon as they arrived in their new communities. On a more
practical level, full-time cooks were added to many of the hostels due to the fact
that, “With the shifting nature of the group in the hostel and the need for evacuees
to be out job hunting it is necessary to have a staff member who gives full time to
cooking.”49 On top of that, volunteers in Chicago and Philadelphia took time to
entertain the children as often as they could taking them to parks, zoos, even
museums so that their parents had some free time to search for housing and
employment. As always, Quaker aid seemed to be accompanied by a large dose
of pragmatism and the concept that they were there to help the Japanese help
themselves.
Counseling was also an incredibly important function at the hostels, with
169 people contacting the AFSC office in Philadelphia alone to seek help with
personal problems during 1944. While it is unnecessary to explain how traumatic
the situation was for the Japanese Americans during the war years, the Quakers
realized that counseling was unavoidable and tried to fit it in wherever possible.
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The hostel directors in Chicago soon became cognizant of the fact that many of
the Nisei were reluctant to take their problems to the AFSC offices because they
didn’t want to bother the men and women who were working to assist them, so
the staff in true Quaker fashion found ways for the Japanese Americans to express
their feelings.
We realized that hostelers needed an opportunity to discuss their
personal problems. In order to avoid making these interviews
formal and stilted, we did not schedule them for any set time, but
let the Nisei know when we were available. Consequently, our
interviewing was accomplished while drying dishes, or helping in
the laundry, or in casual conversations in the living room.
Unsystematic as this method sounds, we believe it has merits. We
feel that we became better acquainted with the Nisei and that we
were able to help them with their concerns, large or small, more
effectively in this informal manner.50
Counseling was incredibly crucial to the resettlement process and it continued to
be so long after the war was over because fear, anxiety and a sense of injustice
were much greater threats to the success of the program than finding jobs or
housing.
Job-hunting for the Japanese resettling in the East kept many AFSC
employees working full time. As the war continued, several Japanese Americans
were employed by the AFSC itself, working as typists, office clerks, or in other
50
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positions ranging from researching the experiences of the Japanese who had left
the camps to giving speeches in front of community groups interested in helping
the Japanese. Gordon Hirabayashi, the famous conscientious objector who was
jailed for his unwillingness to enter the camps contacted the Chicago office about
coming to work for them in the Midwest. They were fully behind him joining
them but let him know that his duties would mostly be limited to office work,
helping to free up some of Joe Brown’s time so “…he would be more useful in
opening many new offers for employment.”51 The Chicago and Philadelphia
offices made lists of people who had recently arrived, what skills they possessed
and what type of work they wished to do. The lists they compiled were circulated
to businesses that were friendly to the Japanese and were in need of employees.
Out West, AFSC employees working in the camps like Floyd Schmoe and Esther
Rhoads often wrote letters to the offices back East asking them if they knew
anyone who would hire someone who was an expert in a certain field. George
Nakashima was an example of one gentleman who received a job with the owner
of an architectural firm on Fifth Avenue in New York City. He was hired to work
on the man’s Pennsylvania chicken farm and used the opportunity as a
springboard to start a sculptor studio that received international fame after
Schmoe wrote a lengthy letter explaining not only Nakshima’s architectural and
design experience but also the merits of Mr. Nakashima’s entire family. This
included details regarding his in-laws as well as the family’s personal beliefs
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regarding pacifism and Nakashima’s desire to stay true to his creative abilities as
opposed to simply wishing to accumulate wealth.52
The Chicago office made a list of jobs that had been filled by Issei and
Nisei in the area: “Some of the types of positions which have been filled are hair
dressing, secretarial, tool workers, industrial design, chemists, radio technicians,
floral designers, civil service, accountants, welders, clerical, dressmaking, food
store managers, and photo finishers.”53 The Chicago hostel reported that three
quarters of the Japanese who arrived in Chicago had not found jobs before they
had arrived and it took them about ten to fifteen days to find a job once in the
windy city. “Finding a job is not a real problem. Finding the job to fit you,
however, can be.”54 One of the main problems that the Friends were concerned
about was whether everyone was getting paid a fair wage equal to people of other
races living in the cities to which they relocated. The AFSC employees worked
hard to bring employers onboard who wouldn’t try to cheat the Japanese, knowing
that they could easily be taken advantage of under the circumstances. The hostels
also stood as meeting houses where the Japanese could introduce themselves to
prospective employers in towns like Cincinnati where there had never really been
a Japanese American presence before the war. The Friends soon found that
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having white liaisons standing by to introduce the Japanese Americans to
potential employers was incredibly helpful.55
As the outcome of the war started to look more optimistic and Americans
gained victories both in Europe and the South Pacific, the government started to
see the merits of getting the Japanese out of the camps, even if it meant letting
them return to the West Coast. During the week of December 19, 1944, Morris
wrote a letter to Schmoe discussing the results of the Mitsuye Endo and Fred
Korematsu’s cases that the Supreme Court ruled on over the course of one day.
Morris stated that, “The decision of the army to cancel the restriction orders on
the return of evacuees to the west coast is news of first importance. The Supreme
Court apparently finally got around to delving into this issue, one decision as you
know (Korematsu), upheld the constitutionality of the evacuation order, and the
other by unanimous decision held that the evacuees could not be held in
relocation centers (Endo). This means that we have now entered into a new phase
of the whole program.”56 This of course caused a major change in direction for
the AFSC which had up until that point been focused on helping the Japanese
resettle in the East. The trend up until that time had been 70% or more of the
Japanese leaving the camps and moving east of the Rockies, but once the
exclusion order was rescinded on the West Coast 70% or more were heading back
to their hometowns in the West. “Manzanar is still running 90% to Los Angeles.
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Minidoka is running 75% back to Seattle and 25% to the rest of the country.”57
This of course meant a huge drive to find housing and jobs for the returning
Japanese, a tough proposition because both were hard to come by in major West
Coast cities.
Once again the Quakers went into emergency mode as they tried to
accommodate the Japanese and their needs in Los Angeles and Seattle. Esther
Rhoads worked from Pasadena, California to ensure that there were beds available
in hostels they set up throughout the Los Angeles area. In addition to beds, jobs
had to be secured, staff had to be present to assist the Japanese as they arrived,
and money needed to be raised to meet the financial needs of the hostels. “We are
so swamped with people in the two hostels that we are way behind with reports,
and the minutes that I am enclosing do not include all the statistics you would like
to have. Is there a chance that Joe Brown could be salvaged from CPS now that
demobilization is so near the end? We need someone with experience in hunting
openings for people with special skills.”58 In Seattle Schmoe reported that while
community acceptance wasn’t a great problem in Seattle and Portland, in the rural
areas it had been a nightmare:
In the Yakima Valley and at various places in the White RiverPuyallup Valley there is organized resistance of a venomous form.
Although substantial and respected residents are active in their
opposition, the majority of those opposed would not be considered
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the “best people” of the community. We know that returning
evacuees have been denied entrance to their own homes by the
tenants, and that some have been told to their face that they were
not welcome in the community and would not find it comfortable
to remain.59
So with more than a quarter of their property and possessions stolen or destroyed,
and with hostels overrun by returning evacuees, it was a real problem finding
suitable housing for the Japanese in communities that were less than enthusiastic
about their return.60 But the return was inevitable, and because the government
decision to close the camps once again did not take into account the humanitarian
crisis that might ensue when 70,000 people were forced out all at once, it was up
to the Christian organizations to assist in the resettlement of the West Coast.
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INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DIFFICULTIES
What were some of the factors that made the Quaker’s effort to assist the
Japanese turn into such a cumbersome task? The main problem could probably
be tied to the fact that the Friends just didn’t know how to say no, and they were
willing to help out on so many different levels that they found themselves spread
incredibly thin. The AFSC became a clearinghouse not only for people leaving
the camps but also for ideas, public relations, news, references, legal aid, and
many other matters. At the same time, the AFSC constantly found itself in the
middle of negotiations between the government and the Japanese community. It
tirelessly met with the WRA and acted as a liaison for the Japanese while at the
same time doing a lot of the humanitarian work that rightfully should have been
done by the government. A list is needed to accurately document exactly how
many pots the Quakers had their hands in, and how many ways in which they
worked to help the Japanese out.
At the very start of the evacuation the AFSC dove right into the effort,
“…assisting the Japanese in caring for or disposing of their property during
evacuation and attempted to befriend them in many ways in the evacuation
process.”61 The chief of Community Services at Minidoka and a government
employee, George Townsend, sent a letter on Nov. 6, 1942 to Robert O’Brien, the
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new director of the student program with the NJSRC. “First, that there be sought
out those groups likely to be opposed and vociferous in their opposition to such
relocation, and then make an attempt to get them to support such a program. I am
thinking particularly of the American Legion. I think that such an organization
could be shown their obligation and their cooperation secured because it would
further their Americanization program. To relocate American citizens, those
young people about whom there is no question of loyalty.”62 Christy Snider
revealed why Townsend as well as others would have approached NGO’s during
World War II in order to direct public relations campaigns when she explained,
“By 1945 America’s decision making elite had realized that several international
interest groups were effective in influencing public opinion, and they wanted to
use this ability to advance governmental ideas.”63
Publicity was always an important factor in the war the Friends waged
against discrimination, their attempt to create an atmosphere of what they
constantly referred to as “fair play” in the US. The Quakers were always out in
the communities speaking publicly in regards to relocation and the situation in the
camps. In a report from the Friend’s center in Cincinnati they stated, “In all
denominations, including Catholic, Jew and Negro, the women’s organizations
have asked for someone to come and explain the problem and to make practical
suggestions of what their group might do. Young people’s groups and ministerial
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association also call for speakers.”64 Meetings were set up throughout Midwest
and East Coast towns with the local YMCA’s, YWCA’s and various other
Christian groups so that they could spread the word regarding resettlement, what
that effort entailed, and what these groups could do both physically and
financially to help out the Japanese. Another aspect of public relations that the
Friends took on was a letter writing campaign addressing racist or other antiJapanese rhetoric found in the popular media.
One such letter was to the 20th Century Fox Film Corporation in response
to a movie it had produced titled “Little Tokio in the U.S.” Morris wrote to Fox
stating, “The arousal of racial prejudice in violent form, which `Little Tokio in the
U.S.’ tends to create, will react on racial minorities such as the Jews, Negroes and
others. It would be disastrous to create several classes of citizenship in this
country. I hope you will realize the damage which you are doing in this matter
and will withdraw `Little Tokio in the U.S.’”65 Twentieth Century Fox of course
responded by saying thank you for the letter but it did not believe its film was
derogatory or inciting in any way. While Fox blew the Quakers off, the
publishers behind Superman did respond favorably to one of Morris’s letters.
In July of 1943 Ruth Gefvert wrote to Morris asking: “Can’t something
be done about Superman? The panels have been pretty bad propaganda and one
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definitely gets the idea that there are no loyal Japanese at all.”66 What she was
referring to was a cartoon depiction of Superman turning himself through
“amazing muscular control,” into “a Jap”, where he could scale the fences of the
relocations centers and “Proceed with my plan!”67 Morris wrote to the editors of
McClure Newspaper Syndicate stating that: “This series gives the distinct
impression that all Japanese in the Relocation Centers are traitors, saboteurs, and
disloyal to the American Government. I want to protest to you against this type of
misrepresentation of a whole people to the millions of children who read
Superman.”68 In this case the managing editor of McClure Newspaper Syndicate
wrote to Morris himself, apologizing for the impression that Superman was
against the Japanese Americans, and included with his letter the following week’s
episode of Superman saying, “You will be pleased to note that Superman gives
full credit to loyal Japanese-Americans.” In it Superman states: “It should be
remembered that most Japanese-Americans are loyal citizens, many are in combat
units of our armed forces, and others are working in war factories. According to
government statistics not one act of sabotage was perpetrated in Hawaii or
territorial U.S. by a Japanese American.”69 Whether or not it was the influence of
the Friends and the letters that Morris wrote to Shuster and Siegel’s editors we
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can’t say, but it is hard to imagine Superman doing such an about face in regards
to the Japanese Americans if someone hadn’t chastised him beforehand.
A list put together in November of 1942 is a good example of all that the
AFSC programs included: camp visitation, continuing student location,
individual and industrial placement of evacuees, encouraging adult educational
programs, placement of volunteer workers within the camps, sending toys,
Christmas presents and layettes to evacuees in camps, and interpretation of the
Japanese-American problem to the public.70 Besides items on that list there were
also car loads of goods that needed to be shuttled to the camps from cities like
Seattle and Los Angeles because the Japanese had only been allowed to bring a
very limited number of supplies along with them. Legal matters were so
important that the Minidoka camp had a whole office devoted to settling disputes
that arose between people in the camps and whites out on the West Coast because
many locals were basically stealing Japanese property or taking over their
businesses in their absence. Friends were enlisted to help out on occasions and
their lawyers were also employed to help defend the few people who had fought
the exclusion order; Quakers like Hirabayashi who refused to enter the camps and
turned himself in to the FBI. These cases went on for months if not years and
while only one of the cases ended in favor of the Nikkei it was important to file
cases in the courts to show that the Japanese were willing to stand up to the
illegality of the government’s actions. Representatives were also needed to visit
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banks and take care of financial arrangements since the Japanese couldn’t do it
themselves.
The AFSC helped intercede with banks both in the US and Japan because
both governments had frozen all Japanese American assets, and of course endless
letters had to be written in triplicate on manual typewriters to properly take care
of documenting all the transactions taking place.71 There were also many
personal requests and favors that the AFSC responded to as well. To illustrate the
fact that no request for help was too small or too big for the Friends to address,
late in 1942 Morris received a letter from Mr. Isamu Noguchi, and wrote a two
page letter to the WRA for him in reference to the lack of recreational facilities in
the camps. Mr. Noguchi, a international renowned New York city artist who
attempted to help with the social planning at the Poston Arizona camp by
voluntarily entering the camp complained to him that all the movies shown were
either produced by the government or by state schools and were either propaganda
films or incredibly boring. He asked to have more of a variety, and added,
“Pictures of this sort might be rather serious diet but if they could be interspersed
with films of a lighter vein it would help materially in the educational life of the
camps.”72
On the other end of the spectrum the Quakers stepped in to help Japanese
Americans who weren’t even imprisoned in the camps. At one point the WRA
had the audacity to ask the Quakers to assist in relocating 15 Japanese Americans
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from Norfolk Virginia because they were too close to Naval installations. One of
them, Arthur Wataru Tada wrote to the AFSC looking for advice on moving to
Cincinnati Ohio. Tada had lived in Norfolk for 35 years but had been “rounded”
up along with the other local Japanese-Americans at the start of the war but had
been released by the government in October of 1942, and by June of 1943 he was
once again being asked to leave his home and move elsewhere. The AFSC fought
the order stating that these citizens posed no threat to the U.S. Navy and it was
against their constitutional rights to force them to leave their homes. Several
Quakers made trips down to Norfolk to see the small group and also went back
and forth between Philadelphia and Washington D.C. to act as intermediaries
between the Japanese and the War Department. Of course Tada and the rest were
moved to the Midwest regardless of the threat they posed, and the AFSC ended up
housing them in their hostel until they could find their own housing, but the
Friends had tried to help them as best they could.73 All in all the job the Quakers
undertook to resettle the students and assist the Japanese in getting out of the
camps was not a simple one but turned into hundreds of other small endeavors
which weren’t clearly defined or easy to turn down.
One of the first problems to confront the AFSC when the WRA asked for
their help in relocating the Japanese American students was their virulent distaste
for the exclusion order in and of itself. Right from the start arguments were made
and apologies sent out to American Friends in order to explain that the AFSC was
only taking on this task to give aid to the Japanese Americans and was not doing
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it in order to assist the racist government. Their overarching aim was to make
sure that the Japanese were able to get out of the prisons as soon as possible. In
an initial message to the Society of Friends written by Clarence Pickett, the
Executive Secretary of the AFSC, he made this clear by stating:
It would be untrue and a matter of regret if the decision of the
Service Committee were understood by the Friends and others to
mean that we accept the evacuation as a matter of course. It has
come to us with deep humiliation and profound concern that events
have revealed in the bloodstream of our American life a poison
which has caused this disease of hatred. Whether it be greed or
race prejudice or war hysteria, it is equally dangerous. It blinds the
patient to the long-established values so dearly bought and which
we had thought are represented in American citizenship: our boast
of fair play and our emphasis on the value of the individual. We
want to call every friend to an examination of his own motives and
the spirit of his life.74
There was a real sense of righteous indignation in terms of how the Quakers felt
about the whole situation in general, and while the members of the AFSC wanted
to help out as much as they could, the government did not make the task easy.
Throughout the war this feeling of distaste continued to linger because the
government had been extremely clever in getting the AFSC to take care of a great
deal of their dirty work for them and this bitter feeling came to the surface in
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letters and reports as the government asked more and more of the Quakers. In
many ways this situation would surface again and again during the second half of
the twentieth century as the US entered conflicts across the globe and NGOs were
asked to walk a fine line between becoming government appendages and helping
those in need. When the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) got involved in
distributing aid and helping rebuild villages during the Vietnam War it battled
over many of the same stumbling blocks. One Mennonite volunteer explained,
“From the beginning MCC workers assumed that they could engage in their work
in a completely nonpolitical way, but they gradually discovered that the moral
choices they encountered were more complicated and difficult.”75 One example
where a Friend actually put her foot down and refused to give aid to the Japanese
on principal alone was in a letter written from Miss Lidie Fite in Pennsylvania to
Schmoe in regards to his request for more clothing to be sent to the prisoners at
Minidoka. She was quite firm in her conviction that no more clothing should be
sent to Idaho. Her point was that the government had the obligation of supplying
their prisoners with clothing, “…that this should be handled through adequate
wages or in lieu of that, cash grants with which they can buy clothing of their own
choice, and that any policy of gift clothing tends to lessen the governments
inclination to meet the problem in the better way.”76
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One of the main problems was that the US government really didn’t think
this process through before they set the wheels in motion. They didn’t have what
could be referred to as a legitimate exit strategy for successfully emptying out the
camps, and while they did create a civilian agency to handle this miscarriage of
justice the fact that the Army made up the rules regarding who was free to leave
the camps served to make the situation much worse than it needed to be. In 1942
the US waged war against two of the most technologically superior forces the
world had ever seen and entered World War II before being adequately prepared
to face either the Germans or the Japanese. As a result, the Army didn’t place a
high priority on taking care of a group of prisoners who neither they nor the FBI
thought should be incarcerated in the first place. For example, when Robbins
Barstow went to meet with Colonel Tate in regards to approving colleges that the
Japanese could attend, he reported back that “Their department has been so
rushed, with McCloy turning so many war details over to him that he has had to
wrestle with this student problem evenings at home.”77 One of the reasons why
only a few students were able to attend colleges or universities during the 1942-43
school year was because the Army took so long approving acceptable institutions
which didn’t house defense laboratories or were somehow connected to homeland
security. Reed Cary wrote of one stipulation that the AFSC had to overcome
which had the program “bogged down at the present moment because an Army
officer having the rank of colonel has issued regulations for student movement
which would prevent students from being entered in a college located within 25
miles of a railroad junction. Preliminary investigation indicates that there may be
77

AFSC Archives. Japanese American Relocation, Reports. 1942.

62
five such institutions in the United States, but the quality of these five leaves it
open to grave question as to whether they really are colleges or not.” He went on
to say, “Responsibilities which should be in the hands of men of top rank remain
in the hands of small underlings who are bound hand and foot by regulations and
by the fear of displaying an initiative which is by rule limited to superiors.”78 The
Mennonites complained about similar policies that impeded their work in
Vietnam and forced three of their top MCC volunteers to quit after signing a
petition against US action in Vietnam along with 48 other long term volunteers.
Paul Rodell explained their reaction to the government: “The signers believed in
their volunteer organization, but recognized that American’s war policies were
negating their efforts and destroying Vietnam. After having worked faithfully
within the system for years, they concluded that the only way to help Vietnam
was to change American policy. They thus decided to give up their positions in
protest and hope their action would have a positive impact. This was a difficult
decision to reach, as they had great affection for Vietnam and its people, and
resigning meant severing many personal and professional ties.”79
The AFSC also had to deal with two separate bureaucracies in Washington
DC, the Department of War which initially administered the assembly centers and
made up the rules regarding who was free to leave and where they were free to
relocate, and the newly-developed WRA that was responsible for all of the
relocation centers except one, which was under the control of the Indian
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Administration. In any case all of the groups involved were in charge of devising
the overly confusing rules and as one report explained, “All these agencies and
individuals being technically in the defense area are under rulings of General
Dewitt. You can see it is all pretty complicated and it has been necessary to
designate one of the staff to study these relations and to discover how and where
contacts should be made and serve in general as the liaison person.”80 On top of
administration woes, the government worked to manipulate many of the projects
that they had requested the AFSC get involved with, a problem also noted by the
MCC in Vietnam. “MCC staffers in Vietnam encountered problems when
working with their own government. As early as 1955 they began to resist efforts
by U.S. aid officials to assume operational control of MCC personnel. Within
two years, staffers in Vietnam were reporting home that they had faced so many
`difficulties’ working with U.S. relief officials that they had decided to work
instead through the Vietnamese government.”81 Joining forces with the overlysuspicious Diem administration turned out to be a disaster in so many ways that
the Mennonites returned to working with the US, a clear case where it is better to
be in bed with the devil you know than the one you don’t.
In 1945 Schmoe sent a report to the national office detailing all of the
problems he had been having finding housing around Seattle, adding, “The
W.R.A. is very anxious for us to open a hostel,” since the Navy had taken the
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Japanese Buddhist Temple and made it into a school for Naval cadets.82 It had
been the WRA who had been asking the AFSC to open more hostels all across
America for three years, but on several occasions they had undermined the
Friend’s work in different locations as well. In one instance the WRA encouraged
the AFSC to open up a hostel in Columbus, Ohio, and the Friends in turn spent
several weeks doing quite a bit of legwork to find a building, contact people who
would run it, and other logistical matters. Then the WRA came back to the
Friends saying, “The situation had changed somewhat with regard to available
jobs in Columbus, and the WRA here changed its mind rather suddenly in regard
to the actual need for the undertaking.”83
Jobs were another way in which the government stood in the way of
progress. Morris wrote to complain about the length of time it took the Defense
Command to provide permits for Japanese wishing to leave the camps. He stated,
“When an employer wants to hire a man he wants to complete the engagement at
once and does not want to wait for four to six weeks before securing an
employee.” He concluded the letter by saying that the reports concerning
increased tension in the camps were very concerning, and that possibly getting
people out of the camps by expediting their permits to leave would help alleviate
some of those tensions.84 In addition to that, the government slowed things down
with the constant threat of revoking draft deferments for some of the most
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important members of the AFSC staff. Dozens of letters were written concerning
whether or not Joe Brown would indeed be drafted into the Army, whether or not
his deferment would come through, or whether he would be able to continue his
work as the primary job hunter in Chicago or have to report to a CPS work
camp.85 In the end his draft was deferred by the Selective Service but it made him
spend the majority of the war working alongside other Quakers doing manual
labor in special work camps, only allowing him to return to Chicago in 1945 to
help liquidate the camps of the remaining Japanese. But feelings of righteous
indignation towards the government and other forms of outside interference
weren’t the only things slowing the Quakers down when it came to getting the
Japanese resettled.
As mentioned earlier, Quaker philosophy, moving ahead quickly and
without taking time to sit quietly and meditate over a problem isn’t part of their
modus operandi. Rufus Jones, the first chairman of the AFSC stated in an
introduction to the history of the first twenty years of the AFSC that: “Nothing in
this long period has been settled by a majority vote which overrode the judgment
of a strong minority opposed to it. All matters of importance have been
luminously presented to the whole group, corporately considered, looked at from
many angles, threshed out in clear, open light and decided by unanimous
judgment.”86 This sense of consensus must have been incredibly hard to come by
in a time where there were no such things as conference calls, the World Wide
Web, or red eye flights from coast to coast. At one point Robbins Barstow, the
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director of the NJASRC complained, “We have had to call off the Executive
Committee meeting for Monday because all our committee members are scattered
all over the country. Marsh suggested that it might be well to hold a general
conference in early October.”87 This letter was written in August, so it is easy to
imagine that from a logistical standpoint it was incredibly difficult to get people
together for meetings to organize a completely unprecedented undertaking.
One of the first hindrances to moving the Japanese out of the camps was
the fact that the Friends did everything with kid gloves or as if they were walking
on egg shells. They took their time accepting the applications of students and
individuals wishing to leave the camps and dealing with the Army and the WRA.
The only people who upset this tradition and fought the slow and methodic
plodding of the National office were the volunteers out in the field, predominantly
those in the West like Schmoe and Esther Rhoads who could not accept the
injustice of the situation and wanted things resolved immediately. A good
example of how visiting the camps and witnessing the problem first hand changed
one man’s willingness to speed things up was revealed in a letter to the Executive
Committee of the NJASRC from Robbins Barstow: “The feeling of urgency
comes by reason of the fact that all those people on the West Coast know
personally scores if not hundreds of these young people who are involved. They
have all been flooded with personal appeals and personal letters and thus have a
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first-hand interest in the problem.”88 Barstow concluded this letter by saying that
after he had gone out to three of the prison camps and met the students and young
people who were waiting for word on whether they could get out and attend
colleges in the East, he felt he “…could say from personal observation, what I
already felt in principle, that we must do everything possible as quickly as may be
on their behalf.”89
Another issue that could be looked at as a double edged sword for the
Quakers centered on the fact that the Friends always wanted to get the job done
right, feeling that if things were done too quickly they might be completed in a
haphazard fashion and have disastrous results in the long run. As a result of this
striving for perfection, everything was done in a slow and thoughtful manner,
whether it was making sure that the first wave of students to go East were the very
best, that the right job was found for every individual looking for employment,
that adequate housing was located in decent neighborhoods where people would
find little to no resentment, or that the government didn’t feel like the Quakers
were pressuring them to get things moving simply because they had removed due
process and imprisoned American citizens. One excellent example of their
assiduousness was a letter from the director of the Chicago office, Edwin
Morgenroth, who complained to Schmoe about people fudging in regards to their
job qualifications. “Our policy here has been not to recommend domestic
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employment for evacuees who were not trained household workers and who
intended to use it merely as step stones to other work. We feel that we can find
this `other work’ for them now and that it is harmful to community relations for
them to use domestic employment merely as a means of getting out of camp.”90
In August of 1942, Robbins Barstow once again wrote to the Executive
Committee: “The judicious placement of a few hundred carefully selected
students at this time, with opportunity to demonstrate to the community at large
the safety and soundness of the plan, may, and we hope will, without untoward
incident, lead to a development of tolerance and good will.”91 It was as if the
AFSC felt that they could only bring the Japanese into communities that would be
completely and utterly tolerant towards them and every situation that they
encountered had to be ideal and without any reservations which was probably
unrealistic if not utterly impossible.
At a meeting with church leaders in Minneapolis one AFSC volunteer
stated, “One of the questions often asked is, `Should we start a nation-wide
publicity campaign to get assistance in selling the idea?’ It is my opinion that it is
best to go quietly and work carefully through key people and settle a few at a
time. There are a large number of people to be resettled, but I would not advise a
large conspicuous group to go into any community.”92 Whereas in the West
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people working with the Japanese didn’t have this sensation that waiting around
for public sentiment to get better was absolutely necessary and relocating a
handful of Japanese into each community after the waters had been tested was
realistic. That process would have, as Schmoe alluded to in one of his letters,
taken years if not decades to complete because there were 120,000 people sitting
in the camps waiting for public sentiment to turn in their favor. On top of the
worries regarding public sentiment and getting things perfect there was always the
simple fact that there was just too much to do.
Edwin Morgenroth sent a report to the national office stating, “We have
over 400 cases in our Japanese American placement files right now. Our
telephone load last month was 700 outgoing calls in excess of our minimum. Bob
Fort and Garry have been sent off today for a week to rest. The doctor has felt
that the strain was too great for Garry. They have had much to learn in a short
time and I feel that they are growing slowly. I do not feel that we can use him to
take any of the work that Joe has been doing.”93 Morgenroth added to this by
explaining that the Chicago office had too much on his plate, and even the 20
volunteers they had could not stay on top of all the work that was being asked of
them; he went so far as to ask the national office to send him several full-time
employees to help his secretary, Ruth Urice, because she “…has been attempting
to do the work of organizing the volunteers and caring for her other stenographic
and office duties as well. I hesitate to say that it is impossible for her to go on
doing this because `impossible’ is a strong word and one which we seldom if ever
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use. Perhaps I should say that it is unwise for us to continue to burden her this
way.”94 Another statement from Reed Cary to Schmoe illustrates how the
situation in the national office was during 1942 when the Friends took on the
student relocation project. “The fact of the matter is that from an administrative
standpoint we have so many irons in the fire that all concerned are spreading
themselves so thin as to jeopardize the conduct of projects to which we are
irrevocably committed.”95
To put this all into perspective the next time that a national disaster would
test both NGOs and the United States government with to the same extent as the
internment would not be until Hurricane Katrina hit the South in 2005. Chris
McMurray stated, “Katrina was the first disaster where the size and scope was far
beyond the capability of most organizations—including the federal government.”
He went on to explain, “The government depends on non-profits to provide
shelter and care for the survivors and skills to provide for people far beyond the
government's ability to provide that care. The decisions regarding allocation of
limited resources led to resentment on the part of disaster victims, a feeling of
being let down by trusted organizations, and Congressional questioning. Most
importantly, the survivors suffered more than they would have if the organization
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was fully staffed and funded for very large disasters rather than trying to `stretch’
their capability.’”96
The situation was the same for the AFSC during World War II because on
top of the fact that there was too much work to be done by too few employees and
volunteers, many of the committee members had regular jobs to do or to return to
like Robbins Barstow, who reported in late August of 1942, “I must advise the
Executive Committee that my leave of absence from my duties as President of the
Hartford Seminary Foundation terminates as of September 1, and I must devote
my time and energies to my regular obligations.” So while one of the main issues
was the fact that by their very nature Quakers tried to obtain group consensus and
perfection in everything they attempted, the fact of the matter was there was just
too much work for such a small organization to handle. Floyd Schmoe
appreciated this problem and tried to help the Japanese circumvent the slowdowns
wherever he could.
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FLOYD SCHMOE
The most interesting rationale offered for the government’s decision to
imprison Japanese American citizens in concentration camps revolved around the
argument that the Japanese Americans had lived in exclusive enclaves up and
down the West Coast, setting up little Tokyo’s as they came to be called. The
government argued that these Asians had not become part of mainstream America
and by their cohesive nature they weren’t able to be trusted and should be put in
camps. By spreading 120,000 Japanese into 10 camps where they would be an
amalgamation of Japanese nationals and Japanese Americans actually created the
mythic “Little Tokyo.” The War Department conjured ten towns out of mid-air in
the midst of Western deserts, building mini cities that contained only one race.
Because this propaganda was often featured in the national press there arose a
sharp contrast between how the national office of the AFSC based in Philadelphia
and how Schmoe and the other employees working in and around the camps in the
West felt the resettlement should be carried out from a practical standpoint. The
argument rested on whether the Japanese should leave the camps to resettle in
individual family units or whether they should relocate in larger groups, setting up
communes in the Inter-Mountain West?
In July of 1943 Schmoe wrote a letter to Morris and attached an essay in
which he illustrated his argument that the way in which relocation was taking
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place was too slow and too cumbersome, and so he argued for a massive or
“group” relocation project. This program would seek to take large groups and
settle them in rural areas somewhere between the Cascade/Sierra Nevada
mountain ranges and the Rockies. At this point in the resettlement those in AFSC
headquarters along with the WRA had several arguments against this idea, but
their most consistent rationale was that they wanted to avoid the Japanese setting
up mono-racial ghettos or other small, insular communities. Schmoe on the other
hand felt that individual resettlement was a fine idea for a limited minority of
people who really wanted to get out of the camps and continue with their lives at
any cost, but for the great majority he argued that this was completely unrealistic
for many reasons.97
Schmoe pointed out that by the middle of 1943 about 1,000 people were
leaving the camps each month, and if that trend continued it would take at least
eight years to empty the camps altogether. He felt closing down the camps in this
manner would eventually prove to be entirely impossible, and he believed that
resettlement numbers would begin to quickly trickle off to nothing as the Nisei
and other more adventurous Japanese left for the east. He predicted that the
largest number of people who would be willing to start from scratch would be no
more than about twenty-five to thirty thousand men and women who were at the
right age and had the right attitude to take on this endeavor. These individuals,
often referred to as “the cream of the crop”, didn’t have familial responsibilities
that they couldn’t handle in a new city, nor were they in a position where they had
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to take care of the young or the elderly. Schmoe argued that the Issei along with
the Sansei would never willingly leave the camps.
Those who remain will face this situation. They will be well past
the prime of life or they will be dependent children. They will
have almost no financial resources. They will not have older
children capable of making a way and a place for them. They will
not have the ambition to try again. Many of them will have serious
language handicaps. Many of them will represent professions such
as doctors, dentists, lawyers, barbers, salesmen, and teachers who
will have no opportunity in their own field because a new start
would depend upon a Japanese clientele.98
Schmoe’s solution was to take all the people who fit into these categories and
move them in large groups either onto public reclamation land, or in several cases
let them start up actual long-term communities in and around the camps where
they were already living. Of course they would take down the barbed wire,
remove the fences and build permanent homes to live in and move around freely.
In a recent interview, Atsushi Kiuchi mentioned that the Minidoka center
encompassed thousands and thousands of acres, had the infrastructure to be
completely self sufficient, and had the ability to produce all the goods a Japanese
American town needed to survive and prosper, except ironically enough, the
ability to grow rice.99
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According to Schmoe, there was no “ideal” solution for resettlement, but
the camps at that point had already become “home” to thousands of people who
really didn’t want to leave. “They are proud of their `city.’ Some of them
actually feel they are better off in camp.”100 Group resettlement would give the
Japanese what they needed most, the economic strength and buying power that
comes with numbers, a sense of confidence that comes with freedom, and a
feeling of security because the Japanese would all be living together without
having to face white racism and discrimination every time they stepped outside
their doors. Schmoe had a strong opinion regarding the fact that it was the Issei
that had worked so hard to set a good example and had done such an incredible
job raising the Nisei to become successful American citizens. The Issei therefore,
should have the opportunity to continue that work for the final years of their life,
which wasn’t going to be for very long because by the 1940’s the medium age of
their generation was around 60 years old. He stated that the new camps wouldn’t
last forever because the children that remained with their parents would want to
leave once they reached university age and had a desire to assert their own
independence. And the communities wouldn’t disappear as the youth left because
by that point other groups would move into those successful towns like Mexican
Americans, and they in turn would help to make them multi racial towns.
While Schmoe never mentioned the fact that America was already a
country that had embraced the concept of separate but equal for African
Americans with the Supreme Court ruling on Plessy vs. Ferguson, his feeling was
100
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why wouldn’t that same concept work for Japanese Americans? Schmoe believed
that America had always been a place of segregated colonies, from the Irish
ghettos in the East to the Mormons in Salt Lake City and the Mexican-American
communities out West, and that these colonies had lasted only as long as it took
successive generations to become Americanized and spread their wings as fullfledged members of English speaking America. He stated that the locations for
Japanese American communes should be rural but in nicer environs than most of
the relocation camps, and that the economic foundation should be based on
farming. He understood full well that only about forty percent of the Japanese in
the camps had been farmers before the war, but also knew that Japanese culture
dictated that the majority of individuals adjust to new roles in order to help
advance the group as a whole. He felt that those who wished to leave and set up
businesses and farms on their own would be better off to leave the camps and get
started as soon as possible, and that if these individuals and families waited for
the war to end they would face the huge problem of competition from both
soldiers returning from the war and new immigrants coming in to compete for
land, jobs, and housing. Strangely enough many of his forecasts came true as
only one third of the internees ended up leaving the camps before 1945 and those
who waited to resettle at the end of the war faced incredible shortages of both
housing and employment.
In the national headquarters of the AFSC Morris disagreed with this plan
almost in its entirety. He believed that setting up these communities would take
too long, would be too expensive to build and that the government would not
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want to get involved in the first place. It is amusing that his arguments against
starting up new communities count the major detriments as time, money, and lack
of government involvement because those are three things the government had
been willing to expend when it had built ten cities out of scratch that were able to
house 120,000 people at the start of 1942. It had done these things so well
actually that within two years the majority of their prisoners didn’t want to leave
their new tarpaper barracks nor did they lack for any of the necessities that would
make them so uncomfortable they would feel forced to get out. The problem of
course was that the government only gave the Japanese resources and
transportation for their one-way entrance into the camps, and once the United
States was fully engaged in the war the army was too busy to focus on getting
them out of the camps. Actually several members of the government did support
the idea of group resettlement and were willing to explore it further.
Don Elberson, the Superintendent of Business Enterprise for Tule Lake
sent a memo to his headquarters in Washington late in 1943 stating that
communal living and group resettlement was a great idea for many reasons. He
explained that cooperative farms had already been set up by several groups of
Japanese interned at Tule Lake, and one had taken root in Spokane, Washington
along with another in Grand Island, Nebraska. Schmoe had also supported
Elberson’s argument by helping to set up several agricultural cooperatives himself
throughout southwest Idaho where dozens of Japanese had settled to work on
farms in the Nampa-Caldwell area.101 But the difference between the Schmoe and
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Elberson models was the fact that Elberson felt that no more than ten families
should leave to work on one communal farm together, and he further believed that
they should be interspersed amongst other ethnic groups who would own all the
major services to support them in nearby towns. Schmoe on the other hand
thought that hundreds if not thousands of Japanese could found their own small
communities and with careful consideration could take care of supplying all of
their own services with limited help from outsiders.
The key to his argument regarding why farmers should stay somewhere
between the Rockies and the Pacific Ocean also had a lot to do with the type of
farming that took place on either side of the continental divide. Moving the
Japanese into the Midwest was fine as long as they stayed in the cities, but Issei
farmers knew nothing about the big grain operations that covered the Midwest nor
did they have the investment capital available to buy the tractors and combines
needed to manage those large farms. Out west they had predominately been truck
farmers utilizing less than ten acres to grow produce or berries and selling them to
local markets and at roadside stands. They had no idea about selling grain on the
commodity market and while they certainly could learn how to do all this with
time, it was a lot easier to wait for the war to end and hopefully go back to doing
what they already knew or relocate onto small farms in Idaho or Eastern
Washington.
Although Morris never admitted he might have been wrong in denouncing
Schmoe’s ideas in any of his letters, the following year he managed to prove that
Schmoe’s theory did hold water and could be implemented. Morris went to visit
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the Quaker owned and operated Seabrook Farm in New Jersey where he found
that the massive Quaker farm employed hundreds of laborers all working
together. They included blacks, whites, even POW’s from Italy and Germany,
and by August of 1944 it had added 200 Japanese Americans to its payrolls with
65 more en route from the West. The owner of the farm secured draft deferments
for all Nisei over the age of 26 and wanted at least 2,000 Japanese Americans
working for him on a seasonal and a year-round basis.102 As far as discrimination
at Seabrook, Morris reported that the local community accepted the Japanese once
they realized that local business and community leaders had given them a warm
welcome. This group experiment in New Jersey appears to have been a
successful example of settling large groups of Japanese in a communal
environment, one that combined the various ideas proposed by Schmoe and
Elberson. Of course as the war continued and there seemed to be light at the end
of the tunnel these ideas were pushed to the wayside, but that did not stop Schmoe
from coming up with other radical ideas as well.
Schmoe went with any idea he could think of to get the Japanese out of the
camps quickly and efficiently, even if it was to the chagrin of his superiors in
Philadelphia. His next major plan, one that was also dismissed by Morris was a
push to set up a halfway house in Spokane, another hostel of sorts, but he had a
much grander vision for the Spokane hostel. He and his colleague Emmett W.
Gulley wrote to Morris saying that the best bet for a hostel in Spokane was on an
abandoned college campus located just outside of Spokane. The college could be
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rented for $75.00 a month or less and could house somewhere between fifty and
one hundred people. With a small work crew Schmoe believed it could be fixed
up quickly using about a dozen men and could be turned “…out into shape for
living in a very short time.”103 There was plenty of irrigated and farmable land
surrounding the college and Schmoe spent many hours traveling around the area
with community leaders looking to find the perfect spot to set up a communal
farm for the Japanese Americans. He then took a number of Issei and Nisei men
out to inspect the college and they agreed that it was a great location. He planned
to set up a work camp that June made up of volunteers and Japanese Americans
who could come and get the place in order, repair broken windows, set up the
kitchen and bathrooms, and generally clean up the grounds. A Japanese
American couple would be in-charge of the physical maintenance of the hostel
while a Caucasian couple would run the general business affairs. He even found a
family from Caldwell named the Darrows who agreed to take over the whole
operation even though they had just lost their son in a drowning incident at a
Quaker work camp the previous year. They had already donated their large farm
in Idaho to a Japanese American family to help get them out of Minidoka!104
Schmoe then sent a detailed report to the national office of the AFSC, one that
included all the repairs that needed to be done along with the subsequent costs
that would be incurred.
Morris didn’t like the idea very much. Apparently the Selective Service
stopped funding the classes through Quaker universities that allowed
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conscientious objectors to join Civilian Public Service work crews. That meant
there would be no laborers for working on the hostel, and he advised finding a
dormitory or fraternity that didn’t need any repairs. Keeping the costs down was
of course crucial to the success of their efforts, and he wanted to avoid oversaturating the Spokane area by relocating too many Japanese Americans to the
area. Schmoe responded by saying that building up good relations and publicity
in Spokane was important for the long run because people were going to relocate
in that area as soon as they could, and he was angry that there were long lists of
people wanting to leave the camps and head to the East while the Chicago hostel
had a two month waiting list. He encouraged the national office to open another
hostel in Chicago and also requested that he be allowed to go ahead with his plan
in Spokane. As a result of the CPS reclassification by the War Department, the
Darrows agreed to take all the repair work on themselves during the summer and
there were plenty of volunteers who wanted to help, and that didn’t include all the
Japanese Americans who wanted to leave the camps and start work on restoring
the college buildings immediately. He was even pushing the idea of turning the
gym into a building to house a small manufacturing industry, and even included
one such business opportunity in a letter to Morris. “For example: The Auburn
Pottery owned by Japanese and specializing in clay flower pots might be moved
intact to Spokane. They already have a sales office there and imported their clay
from a pit only two miles away. Such an industry would provide relocation for
this family from Tule Lake, employment for a few evacuees, and income as rent
toward the maintenance of the hostel.”105 Morris’s response was that they should
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abandon their ideas regarding the hostel, work with the YWCA or YMCA to use
their facilities and avoid spending any money or investing in a building they
didn’t own. His argument was that the Japanese had “many points of contact” in
Spokane and that they didn’t need a hostel to serve as a jumping off point like in
New York City or Chicago.
So Schmoe worked to circumvent the AFSC national office by putting
together his own committee who agreed to carry out his hostel plan using local
Friends and other religious leaders. He then pulled out his trump card and best
hope for success, informing Morris that “The committee last night is composed
largely of the same group which planned, set up, financed, and for five years
administered the Friends Center in Seattle. This has been, including the purchase
price, an eighteen to twenty thousand dollar project.”106 So with the help of this
committee and all the workers in line to start work, it appeared likely that the
Spokane hostel plan would be implemented. Morris’s immediately replied: “I
view this as a temporary hostel and not a center that might be the basis of an
industry for employment of the Japanese. It seems to me that the matter of
permanent employment and the development of a business for the Japanese
should be kept entirely separate from the hostel. We should not, it seems to me,
get in the position of helping finance industries for them. I hope that in your
thinking you will keep hostel and industry entirely separate.”107 Schmoe was not
happy with this response and the Spokane hostel on the abandoned college
campus never did come to fruition, even with all the work he and others had put
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into it. Within a few months he was writing to the national office about getting a
house rented in Spokane for Gordon Hirabayashi. Hirabayashi wanted a house to
use as a base to help people find jobs and housing as they left Minidoka and
moved into the area, while simultaneously hosting those Japanese moving to the
area until they were able to get on their feet. As the war came to a close and the
Japanese were able to return to the West Coast Schmoe’s focus changed once
again as everyone began returning to Seattle and the rest of the Puget Sound area.
With the lifting of the West Coast ban and the return of loyal Japanese
Americans to the West Coast, Schmoe wrote letters to local hotels and boarding
houses asking if they had any issues with taking in Japanese Americans. In one
such letter to the Hotel Edmond Meany in Seattle he noted, “We anticipate
occasional inquiries asking us to arrange or recommend hotel accommodations.
Since we do not wish to embarrass either our Japanese American friends or the
hotel management, we should like to know in advance whether or not you would
accept, subject, naturally to availability of rooms, Japanese American guests?”108
This request came about because as of February 1945 the AFSC still didn’t have a
Seattle hostel in operation for the returning Japanese. “In the meantime we are
using private homes and various semi public places such as the Friends Center, a
former Japanese congregational church, etc.”109 Schmoe reported to the national
office that “Many people are calling us and more are writing for information.
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Most of the people who have returned find their property in very bad condition
and in perhaps half of the cases they have been robbed and vandalized. We have
organized a work party of about 15 people, mostly university students, who are
spending their Saturdays helping people clean up their places and getting started
living again.”110 The biggest concern for the Friends in Seattle was where to
place the elderly Issei men who were on their own and too old to work and
support themselves.
In March of 1945 Schmoe wrote a letter to Morris stating, “My chief
concern this morning is a home for aged Issei men. Harold Fistere (WRA
regional office) called me down on Friday and asked if we would set up a home
for some 75 old men, mostly bachelors. They can get $50 or more per month for
them… if we will provide the home and management they will provide the men
and the money. We can charge enough rent per man to cover our initial costs as
well as operating expense. It is all cleared with local and state welfare.” Morris
of course wanted to make sure that the welfare department didn’t just drop the
men off and never pay their bills so he asked Schmoe to get everything down in
writing including whether the government would take care of all medical
expenses, and to ensure that the Social Security agency would really pay for the
elderly men. He understood that “The willingness of the Issei to leave the camps
depends largely upon whether suitable living conditions can be arranged for
them.”111 Schmoe also wanted an orchard planted on the property to get the old
110
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men out working a bit and give them some free food to boot.112 By April of 1945
Seattle’s Council of Churches agreed to take over the administration of the home
for elderly men allowing Schmoe and the other members of the AFSC to devote
more time to other tasks as the floodgates opened and Japanese Americans began
returning to the West Coast en masse once the government rescinded the
exclusion order
In addition to getting homes repaired and cleaned up after three years of
neglect an escort service was also instituted in the Seattle area. “On several
occasions we have or have found someone to accompany evacuees back to their
home community on their first visit where they felt reluctant to return alone. We
have met one call for individuals to live with a returning Japanese until he felt
safe to live alone.”113 There was a real feeling of insecurity on the part of the
Japanese returning home and the Friends served as part-time social workers to
these people so that they would feel more comfortable returning to the
communities that they had been thrown out of a few years before. Schmoe also
had plans to turn the work weekends he had instituted into a full-blown 15-man
summer work camp which he advertised in all of the nation’s Quaker bulletins.
The focus would still be on building and cleaning up Japanese owned homes for
their eventual return, but as they were constantly looking for good public relations
and in anticipation of the summer camp Schmoe was “hoping to interest the LIFE
and TIME people in next week’s work party, which will be on Bainbridge Island
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and a ‘natural’ for pubic interest.”114 So as the war came to an end the AFSC was
still incredibly busy but one question needing to be asked though is why had the
Japanese been so unwilling to leave the camps and seek their freedom in different
parts of the country?
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WHY LEAVE?
It seems rather remarkable that 70,000 people were given the opportunity
to leave prison after having been forcibly removed from their homes, placed in
prison camps in remote deserts, and unable to earn a living doing whatever they
were trained to do, and yet chose to remain behind barbed wire. One would
believe that freedom is such an incredibly overpowering emotion that the Nikkei
would have jumped at the opportunity; but once you look closely at the situation,
it becomes clear that there were more reasons to remain in the camps than there
were to leave. As hard as the AFSC worked to get students, individuals, and
families to resettle across the United States what they failed to understand for the
first two years of the war was that they were fighting an uphill battle on many
different fronts. Certainly many American communities didn’t welcome Japanese
refugees with open arms, and of course the government bureaucracy and the
Army made the process slow and cumbersome, but no one could have foreseen
the fact that the majority of Japanese themselves would settle into camp life and
have no intention of leaving once they had been there for awhile.
The first roadblock to leaving the camps was the fact that discrimination
and racism made most of them feel unwelcome in almost every community across
the United States. Several examples of outright discrimination and hatred made it
obvious that white Americans didn’t want to have the Japanese move into their
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neighborhoods. The government had labeled them as a fifth column so
communities who had never been introduced to Japanese Americans before Pearl
Harbor didn’t warm to the idea of bringing traitors into their presence, and this
news made it back to those still living in the camps. In a letter to Edwin
Morgenroth, the director of the AFSC office in Chicago, Morris shows his
concerns about moving people to Chicago after the Dies Committee continued to
stir up Anti-Japanese sentiment. “Chicago has hit a new low. All reports from
there are bad. Community reaction is so bad in Eddie Shimomura’s opinion that
he has wired his brother not to come on the eve of his departure. Discrimination
seems to be growing. Decent jobs are not available to Niseis. George Tokuda is
about ready to call it quits and is looking towards Cincinnati and St. Louis for
work.”115
In Spokane Hirabayashi and Schmoe had to get involved in a dispute
between a group of angry locals and a Japanese family who wanted to resettle in
the area. Upon leaving Minidoka in July of 1943, Mrs. Paul Suzuki found a house
in Spokane that she wished to purchase for $6,000.00. Not only did the owner of
the home change the terms when he found out it was a Japanese buyer, but Suzuki
was also told the house had to be completely paid for up front. This was difficult
because the banks in Spokane refused to loan her any money because her husband
had been born in Japan. On top of their financial woes a man by the name of S.J
Burke threatened legal action and violence against the Suzukis and their property
if they moved into his neighborhood. Schmoe enlisted the help of Mary
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Farquharson, a former Washington State Senator who in turn enlisted the support
of several leading community and religious leaders, the ACLU, the District
Attorney, and even the police department after a rock was thrown through the
front window. They eventually met with the group that opposed having the
Suzukis move into the neighborhood, and when the men showed up in a drunken
state to find the house full of supportive neighbors and six local ministers along
with a Catholic priest they quickly backed down. While nothing came of the
threats and no more physical violence was demonstrated by the community, this
situation certainly reveals some of the animosity that the Japanese Americans had
to face in order to simply buy a home and move into a new neighborhood.116
Hirabayashi wrote to Schmoe saying, “One Issei voiced the sentiment of
many when she said: The Government has crushed our 30 years’ sweat stained
foundation. We now have nothing, not even our confidence. It is too much for
officials to ask us to resettle. Do you expect us to go into an unknown, possibly
hostile community and risk all that now? What for? Here in camp the food is
terrible and atmosphere not of the best. But our friends are here; we have our
social contacts; we can get used to the mediocre meals. The Government took
everything away from us. They must give us a decent set-up before we can again
go out. I do not intend to go out until then.”117 To sum it up best, Hirabayashi
ended his letter to Schmoe by stating bluntly, “I am afraid the end of the war will
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find that the Government has created a new group of permanent wards. I don’t
see how some of them will ever be able to get out on their own again.”118
In Seattle the situation affected not only housing or employment, but also
the very ability of the Japanese Americans to compete in the market. When
Japanese Americans were allowed to return to the Northwest and take back their
farms and businesses, Seattle’s labor unions stepped in to create a situation where
Japanese farmers could not get their produce to market. This was a real show of
patriotism during a time when food shortages threatened the war effort. Schmoe
sent a telegram to the head office in Philadelphia stating, “Situation Japanese
American grown produce Seattle area critical. Local commission men refuse to
buy. AFL Union involved. Ten tons green peas, five thousand crates head
lettuce… ready for harvest this week. Requires quick action if food is to be saved
and growers given fair deal. Mrs. Mary Farquharson now in Washington, knows
situation and will see you this week.” Morris replied to the letter by stating what
seems to be incredibly obvious: “It seems to me that in the unusual food shortage
which the country is facing at the present time it is hard to believe that this
situation should prevail. If there is anything that we can do let us know.”119
Securing adequate housing was a huge stumbling block for people leaving
the camps and the risk of being homeless in a new city, during a war, when they
might not speak English very well, made for a greater sense of insecurity. How
could you honestly ask someone to leave their free shelter in the camps no matter
how inadequate the tarpaper shacks may have been? When they received three
118
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free meals every day? When they were surrounded by all of their Japanese
American family and friends whom they had not had the time to visit before the
war because they had always been too busy working? Then tell them there might
not be any housing or jobs available when they arrived in some massive city back
east like Chicago or New York. An AFSC bulletin on minorities in the US stated,
“Fear of failure to find adequate living quarters causes heads of families to
hesitate to leave the Centers, where the conditions may not be comfortable or
convenient but at least family groups may remain together, and the
inconveniences are shared by all their neighbors.”120
Even in 1945 after the government allowed the Japanese Americans to
return to the West Coast most continued to stay in the camps because once again
there was a real shortage of housing in the West Coast cities and even the hostels
set up by various religious groups to aid in resettlement were overflowing with
Japanese American refugees. Esther Rhoads wrote a letter to the main office in
Philadelphia from Los Angeles where she was running a hostel which illustrated
the situation, “Housing is the great bottleneck in LA, and most of those who have
left the hostel for permanent housing are returning to their former homes or
doubling up with friends.”121 Schmoe added to this report, “There is no difficulty
in securing employment, but housing is almost impossible. There are numerous
houses listed for sale, although prices have doubled in the last three years, a house
for rent is almost never heard of. Apartments can be had in time but it frequently
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takes a month of waiting or searching. We have been able to house temporary
visitors in private homes, at the Friend’s Center, and at the Japanese
Congregational Church.”122
Barracks were also set up in the Japanese Language School and the
Buddhist Temple which had been taken over by the United States Navy during the
first year of the war and had housed a school to teach naval personnel. The
Japanese nicknamed it the “Hunt Hotel” in honor of the Minidoka camp they had
just left. These along with other hostels set up by the Friends and other religious
denominations served as the only affordable shelters the Japanese had while
trying to resettle in Seattle.123
In an attempt to boost morale, the AFSC sent several Japanese Americans
out into the communities in the East to test the waters and see how things were
going for some of the people who had already left the camps. For instance,
Shigeo Tanabe wrote to Morris saying he wanted to work for the AFSC in the
Midwest, traveling around and contacting people in order to find jobs and good
places for the Japanese to go once they left the camps. Morris replied that the
WRA and the AFSC already had plenty of men and women doing that, but that
Tanabe could make a real difference by meeting those who were already out,
finding out how it was going, if jobs were easy to find in their location, then
report back to the camps and let the people know what he had learned. “The
bottleneck in relocation is now in the centers and not on the outside. That is, there
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is considerable hesitation on the part of the evacuees to leave the centers. Lack of
faith in government promises, reports of bad treatment from those who have gone
out, the uncertainty of the draft, and probably most important of all is the
influence which camp life has had upon the morale of the whole group. They are
being `WPAized’ with all that that means in the loss of morale.”124 The latter
concept related to the fact that the United States government hadn’t taken any
notice of how history had played out for Native Americans who had been
relocated to reservations throughout the country and had lost their initiative along
with their culture and way of life. It was as if they wanted to try one last
experiment on placing another racial group in reservations and see if it would fail
once again.
Clarence Pickett wrote a public relations article that was sent out to many
newspapers around the country that explained some of the major concepts that
stood in the way of people leaving the camps.
Important bottlenecks in the relocation program are the difficulty
of the evacuees to leave the centers. After all has been said about
unfavorable conditions in the centers, this may seem contradictory.
In the first place the evacuees have been on government relief for
more than a year. They have experienced a sense of security in
being wards of the government. During the depression years the
Japanese in this country probably had a better record of managing
to take care of themselves than any other national group. But now
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this independence has forcibly been broken down. Moreover,
many Issei who have lived in West Coast States look forward to
returning to the West Coast at the close of the war. They hesitate
to move to a new community and discourage their children from
doing so because it would separate the family.125
In a letter between two Friends, Helen Brill told Bernard Waring, “The people left
in the centers are mostly of two groups, the fishermen and the farmers. Both
groups usually have large families. The fishermen are not allowed to fish on the
west coast; the farmers are unable to get land, and lack tools. Neither can get
housing. They are without financial resources. They are afraid. And yet the
WRA plans to evict them from the centers.”126 Schmoe on the other hand who
was at Minidoka speaking to the people there and had first-hand knowledge of
their problems sent a report back to Philadelphia stating something entirely
different.
Those who are now found in the Minidoka Center are Issei and
children of school age. The Issei are not opposed to resettlement.
There is no resistance seen on the part of the Isseis against
resettlement. But a great majority of them appear to have given up
their hope to relocate, simply because they are convinced there is
nothing they could do outside to make their living. Were they
farmers, they would not be so thoroughly convinced of their
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inability as they are now. The Minidokans are on the whole
indifferent to resettlement.127
So there were a lot of ideas passed around as to why people did or didn’t want to
leave the camps, but the reality of the situation lay in the fact that until the
government decided to throw everyone out and tear down the facilities, many
people just did not want to leave. One report stated the Nikkei opinion quite
bluntly, “As you know, many of the evacuees do not believe that the centers will
close.”128
As of August of 1945 there were still thousands of Japanese Americans
living in the camps with no intention of moving out. As the war in Europe came
to a close and victory looked probable in the Pacific the Japanese who were left in
the camps were of two minds, they were either waiting it out so they could return
home or they were waiting for the government to move them out by force. In an
article from the Seattle Times dated September 22, 1944, two Nisei brothers,
Fukashi and Takashi Hori stayed at Minidoka and worked at the camp store even
though they were in their mid twenties and could have easily resettled in the
Midwest. According to the article Takashi “had not left because he was waiting
for the moment when it would be possible for him to return home.”129 So it
wasn’t until the government forcibly started closing down services in the camps,
shutting off the water to various housing blocks, tearing down the mess halls, and
finally putting people on buses and trains to ship them back to the coast that the
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camps were finally emptied out. Atsushi Kiuchi summed it up by saying, “The
government didn’t use dogs to get us to leave, but made our lives so miserable we
all wanted to get out.”130 In the end it was one last case of moving a civilian
population en masse from one place back to the other.
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CONCLUSIONS
After analyzing the efforts made by the AFSC to help Japanese Americans
in the concentration camps during World War II there are three questions that
need to be answered. Why did the Society of Friends get involved in the
resettlement program in the first place? How successful was the aid that they
provided and what factors advanced or stood in the way of their success? Lastly,
what were the overall lessons taught by this situation and the conclusions we can
make about America in the 1940’s and today? The important aspect of this
examination is not only discovering the who or the what of the situation, but the
why behind what went on during the 1940’s.
Why would a group of Americans who committed no crime be
imprisoned? Why would the majority of them fail to leave their concentration
camps until the end of World War II, and why were the Quakers unable to
overcome the obstacles that stood in their way? Those seem to be some of the
questions that the Quakers were trying to answer themselves when they entered
into the rather duplicitous role of helping the government embark on the Japanese
American Diaspora.
The Quakers were against the exclusion order from the start, but in the end
they were willing to aid the federal government in its efforts to exclude the
Japanese from the West Coast. That aid was not given lightly, nor did they wish
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for it to be seen as an acquiescence in favor of the government’s position
regarding the Japanese. Clarence Pickett, the Executive Secretary of the AFSC in
1942 sent out a message directed to all Friends in America stating,
It would be untrue and a matter of regret if the decision of the
Service Committee were understood by Friends and others to mean
that we accept the evacuation as a matter of course. It has come to
us with deep humiliation and profound concern that events have
revealed in the bloodstream of our American life a poison which
has caused this disease of hatred. Whether it be greed or race
prejudice or war hysteria, it is equally dangerous. Penitent as we
are on behalf of those who have been the immediate cause, we
want to call every Friend to an examination of his own motives and
the spirit of his life.131
Pickett believed that to amend the wrongs done by his own government every
Quaker should take it upon themselves to do whatever they could to aid the
Japanese Americans during their wrongful incarceration. This may have been
perceived as acquiescence on the part of the Quakers who had traditionally stood
up to fight any form of oppression that denied people their rights but they were
not fighting for their own personal freedoms but for those of another group of
people. When the military stood in the way of progress by making it nearly
impossible for Nisei students to attend universities back east Pickett went on to
illustrate exactly why their work was so important, “The point may come where
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the job the Council has been asked to do is made so difficult as to be impossible
and at that point we should state the situation and withdraw formally. However, it
is not the Council or the Service Committee that would suffer from such
withdrawal, but the students and the Japanese group about whom we all care so
much.”132 Perhaps if it had been West Coast Quakers who had been relocated to
prison camps instead of the Japanese the rest of the Friends might have stood their
ground and chained themselves to the White House fence as they did during the
Vietnam War until every last person were free, but it was not their liberty that was
on the line and they did not wish to make a bad situation worse. The Friends got
involved in this program because their religion dictated that they should help their
fellow human beings as a matter of course and because of their belief on righting
the wrongs done by an oppressive regime and American society as a whole.
Probably the best way to describe how the AFSC personnel approached
the tasks they took on during the war was that they used a shotgun approach as
different needs evolved over time. The whole program evolved and changed as
the war progressed and their response was very fluid and flexible in order to
ameliorate problems as they arose. The umbrella tasks they took on were the
placement of students, the locating of both jobs and housing for people leaving
the camps, the opening and running of hostels to serve as way stations while jobs
and housing were located, and finally aiding in the resettlement of the West when
the exclusion order was lifted. But these were merely the tip of the iceberg and in
reality no job was too small for the Quakers to take on. It was this doggedness
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and “can do” attitude that made the AFSC a great organization to handle this
government manufactured disaster. It had the patience to slowly chip away at any
problem no matter how daunting it seemed while simultaneously accepting any
form of success as a great triumph. But by the end of the war 70,000 people were
still living behind barbed wire in the camps and only 4300 students had been
placed by the NJARC in universities across the country but to the Friends the
operation was a great accomplishment because it focused not on its shortcomings
but on every individual who was able to leave the camps.133
The AFSC staff’s willingness to take on any task meant that in reality the
Quakers efforts were sporadic at best and they couldn’t really give the necessary
attention that their specific responsibilities demanded. The key to their success
was not necessarily getting everything done themselves but like great leaders
anywhere they had the ability to delegate tasks, coordinate efforts, and act as
intermediaries between dozens of different groups. In the East the Council
members were constantly meeting with both the government and civilian groups,
trying to get through red tape, making people aware of the situation and raising
funds so that the Nikkei could leave the camps. Out West the organization’s foot
soldiers met with the Japanese and took care of their immediate as well as their
long term problems showing with their very presence that Friends were never
going to abandon them. Allan Austin summed it up best by saying, “The council
succeeded in negotiating this at-times hostile wartime environment, in part,
because of internal divisions between pragmatic easterners and crusading
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westerners.”134 He goes on to argue that these internal divisions were crucial to
the success of the program because the AFSC appeared to be on everyone’s side.
The men and women in the office back in Philadelphia appeased the government
by always walking on eggshells and not pushing too hard for change while in the
camps people like Schmoe countered Japanese distrust by doing everything in his
power to aid them while simultaneously speaking out against what the
government was doing.
When looking at other historians’ impressions regarding the relationship
between the United States government and international NGOs as the twentieth
century progressed, it is apparent that there are a lot of similarities in the roles
NGOs played when giving aid to civilian populations. The truth is that the AFSC
played quite a different role in this situation for several reasons. First of all the
way in which the government used the Friends to assist them during World War II
didn’t include trying to get them to win the hearts and minds of those receiving
aid like in South Vietnam or Iraq. The propaganda and public opinion drives
were not aimed at the victims of war but at the public in general who were
initially led to believe the Nikkei posed a great threat to them and later were asked
to host them in their communities. Secondly the tightrope NGOs traditionally
have had to walk goes back and forth between three groups consisting of the
federal government and its military arm, whomever the Army might be fighting,
and the civilians who are in desperate need of aid because of the armed conflict.
That leaves the NGO in a precarious position because often times it is impossible
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to tell what side of the battle line the civilians are on; and to the chagrin of the
United States government, NGOs generally want to help civilians regardless of
their political allegiance. That often forces the government to manipulate the
funding they give to NGOs as wars progress, but the Quakers never had to deal
with these issues between 1941 and 1945 because there was never any question as
to who the enemy was and who they were helping. In addition the Japanese
Americans always knew that the AFSC was on their side and wasn’t a
government pawn like the Mennonite Central Committee appeared to be in
Vietnam. Many Nikkei responded to their efforts by saying that in a country
where we they had no friends they could always depend on the Quakers. Lastly,
the fine line that the AFSC did have to walk was in its approach to the
government, whether it voiced its grievances and pushed for more changes or
different policies. The fear was that it would upset the bureaucrats to the point
that they would dig in their heels and want to hurt the Japanese in some way. The
AFSC and the government were not really allies during this situation, but they
weren’t enemies either.
There were some positive outcomes of the internment and the resettlement
process however, the first of which was a new sense of racial awareness. Ross
Wilbur, the Quaker in charge of the hostel in Cincinnati once called to answer an
ad for a room for rent in Cincinnati and the woman who answered the phone had
two sons fighting in the South Pacific. “When I mentioned the Japanese name of
the lad I was calling for, I heard her catch her breath and for a long moment there
was silence on the line, and then her voice, softer but firmer, came to me and I
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saw in my mind’s eye, my mother’s face as she said, `Well, send the lad along,
I’m sure my soldier sons, if they knew, would want their mother to put into living
practice, the democracy they may have to give their young lives for.’”135 Every
individual who left the camps and settled in a new city, went to a university that
had never had an Asian student, or joined a church in a community was an
ambassador introducing the rest of America to a new and vibrant culture. The
barriers that the students broke when they entered universities in the East and
became scholar athletes, presidents of student bodies, and the heads of their
classes helped lead to the adoption of the unfortunate term used by professors
across college campuses in the post-war era: “the model minority.” Perhaps the
most important accomplishment to come out of the resettlement was a program
started by the Nisei and Sansei in the 1980’s. The organization they created was
based on the model set up by the Quakers with the NJASRC; the Nisei Student
Relocation Commemorative Fund has supported the efforts of Southeast Asian
refugees who have wanted to attend university for the past three decades. “A San
Francisco committee awarded eight scholarships of $500 each in 1983. The 2001
ceremony demonstrated the dramatic growth of the fund over its first twenty
years. In that year thirty-eight students received scholarships totaling
$37,500.”136
There was quite a bit that was ironic about the Exclusion Order and the
ordeal that the US government put the Japanese Americans through during World
War II, but did America really learn a lesson after committing such an egregious
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error? Currently the Supreme Court has taken seven years to decide whether it is
unconstitutional to incarcerate over 250 men who have been held without either
charges or civilian trials on a US military base in Cuba.137 Today Americans like
to point their fingers at other countries and boast about their civil liberties but the
modern news media and politicians use the same fear tactics today that Lieutenant
General Dewitt and Shuster and Siegal used during the onset of WWII to silence
Americans and bring them into line. Not only that, but America, the wealthiest
nation on earth, still does little to protect its citizens from natural disasters like
Hurricane Katrina, leaving the bulk of the ensuing humanitarian aid to NGOs and
volunteer workers while hundreds of thousands of able bodied men and women
are deployed fighting wars in the Middle East. Anti-miscegenation laws from the
start of the twentieth century seem laughable in today’s society but Americans are
still telling men and women who they are allowed to marry. California voters
recently passed Proposition 8 which banned homosexuals from legally getting
married by stating, “Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or
recognized in California.”138
It is hard to say how far America has progressed since the end of World
War II, but it is encouraging to know that The AFSC is still fighting for our basic
rights today. The homepage for their website at www.afsc.org makes that clear
when you open it up to find seven headings regarding concerns they are currently
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addressing: “Iraq Campaign; Immigrants’ Rights; Palestinian-Israeli Conflict;
Africa; Life over Debt; Youth and Militarism; Economic Justice; Lesbian Gay
Bisexual Transgender Rights.” George Fox founded more than a religion based
simply on Christian dogma when he introduced the Society of Friends to the
world more than three centuries ago—he inspired a social movement based on
equality, liberty, and the belief that every individual has the power to affect
change in society and make the world a place worthy of God.
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GLOSSARY
Issei: First generation Japanese immigrant.
Nissei: Second generation Japanese American son or daughter of an Issei.
SANSEI: Third generation Japanese American son or daughter of a Nissei.
NIKKEI: Any American of Japanese ancestry.

